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SUMMARY 
The Department of National Defence made some progress in procurement in 
2016 despite obstacles that included a continued drop in spending, the advent 
of a new federal Liberal government and uncertainty over the outcome of the 
Defence Policy Review. 
Four trends affected defence acquisitions in 2016. These include an ongoing 
slippage in recapitalizing the Canadian Armed Forces, some encouraging moves 
made on the shipbuilding and fighter jet files, mixed progress on implementing 
the 2014 Defence Procurement Strategy, and uncertainty over the Defence 
Policy Review. 
It is also too early to tell how the Trudeau government’s Policy on Results, known 
as the “deliverology” approach, will play out for defence procurement. However, 
Budget 2016’s major focus was not on defence, and it shifted some funding for 
capital equipment to a new endpoint of 2045. This suggests that delay in the 
overall defence procurement program continues. 
While the Liberals kept their pledge to make investment in the Royal Canadian 
Navy a priority, they also made good last year on a negative promise – not to 
purchase the F-35 stealth fighter bomber. However, further slowing things is the 
Liberals’ refusal to launch a competition to replace it until the Defence Policy 
Review is published. The government has made this situation more fraught with 
its intention to buy 18 Boeing Super Hornet fighter jets as interim aircraft, since 
Liberal policy requires the Royal Canadian Air Force to be capable of meeting 
both NORAD’s and NATO’s operational needs simultaneously.
Prior to the release of the new defence policy, both the interim and permanent fighter 
aircraft projects lacked adequate funding. They were among several large projects that 
have been approved, but have not yet moved to the contract stage, and whose budgets 
were inadequate to move forward. Adding to this mix is the fact that a government-wide 
effort initiated in 2014 to streamline the defence procurement process made no progress 
in 2016, and a significant number of other prospective projects were not included in the 
DND investment plan. The subsequent Defence Policy Review has addressed the funding 
issues, but they were problematic throughout 2016.
Not all is gloom and doom, however. A contract for 16 fixed-wing search and rescue 
aircraft was awarded, modernization of all of the Halifax-class frigates was completed last 
year, the number of light armoured vehicles deployed in the field rose from 64 to 262, 10 
maritime helicopters were added to the fleet in December, and the new medium-to-heavy 
lift helicopters carried out their first mission by responding to the Fort McMurray wildfires.
1INTRODUCTION
This is the fourth edition of the annual status report on selected major defence acquisitions. It 
retains the focus and structure of the 2015 edition with the intent of providing an informative 
and comprehensive document that can assist anyone who is interested in tracking progress on 
military acquisitions.1
The two groups of projects chosen for this edition are the same ones selected for the 2015 edition. 
Those examined in detail in section 2 (and listed in Annex 1) are taken from the list of projects 
included in the Department of National Defence (DND)’s Departmental Performance Report 
2015/2016, Status Report on Major Crown Projects.2 This is a list of projects that the DND and 
the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) identify as the most important projects over the $100 million 
major Crown project threshold. The inclusion of this list in its entirety removes the element of 
subjectivity from the author of this report in determining which projects to include. This list 
focuses exclusively on projects for defence equipment acquisitions, excluding infrastructure, 
information management, and information technology and service projects. 
The projects analyzed in section 3 are those active projects that appear in both the 2015 and 2016 
editions of the Defence Acquisition Guide.3 As many of the projects have not yet received formal 
approvals, the focus was placed on those projects that the capability sponsors within DND were 
actively working on in calendar year 2016. These two lists are largely complementary as each 
annex focuses on projects at different stages in the procurement process. The five stages of the 
procurement process are: Stage 1 – identification; Stage 2 – options analysis; Stage 3 – definition; 
Stage 4 – implementation; and Stage 5 – close-out.
The projects in section 2 are mostly in either definition or implementation, whereas the projects in 
section 3 are largely in identification or options analysis.4
SECTION 1
Defence Procurement Update
Previous editions of this report have attempted to identify specific sources of delay affecting 
defence procurement. Over the course of 2016, however, little changed with Canadian defence 
procurement. One notable difference from the year prior was that the senior ranks of the 
procurement workforce enjoyed a much higher level of stability in 2016 than 2015. Other initiatives 
with procurement implications were started in 2016, but were not fully deployed. The Privy 
Council Office worked with federal departments to adopt a policy on results which took effect  
1 
The first report in this series was by David Bercuson, Aaron Plamondon and Ray Szeto, An Opaque Window. (Calgary: 
Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2006). See also Elinor Sloan, Something Has to Give (Calgary: The 
Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, and the Centre for 
Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, 2014) and David Perry, 2015 Status Report on Major Defence 
Equipment Procurements (Calgary: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, 
and the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, 2015).
2 
National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, 2015-16 Departmental Performance Report (Ottawa: Her Majesty the 
Queen in Right of Canada, 2016). The timing of this 2016 report made this document the most up-to-date description of 
Canadian defence procurement projects available to the author.
3 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Defence Acquisition Guide 2016, May 26, 2016 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/
business-defence-acquisition-guide-2016/index.page National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Defence Acquisition 
Guide 2015, June 25, 2014 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-defence-acquisition-guide-2015/naval-systems.page 
4 For a description of the procurement process, see http://www.cgai.ca/2015_status_report_on_major_defence_equipment_
procurements#ExplanationofVariance 
2July 1, as the Trudeau government introduced a “deliverology” approach to governing.5 Similarly, a 
wider effort to modernize the broader suite of Treasury Board policies was launched in 2016.6 Both 
of these policy changes have the potential to affect defence procurement significantly, but neither is 
mature enough to provide any assessment of their impact. 
With little new to say about the causes of delay, this year’s report will therefore focus on four broad 
trends that affected defence procurement in 2016: continuing slippage in the overall recapitalization 
of the Canadian Armed Forces; notable advancement of the government’s priority shipbuilding and 
fighter jet files; mixed progress on the implementation of the 2014 Defence Procurement Strategy 
(DPS); and huge uncertainty about the medium- and long-term future of defence procurement 
pending the outcome of the Defence Policy Review.
Continued Recapitalization Slippage
As the 2015 status report suggested, one metric for assessing the rate of success in the defence 
procurement system is DND’s ability to secure project approval at the definition or implementation 
stages of a project’s life from the Minister of National Defence or the Treasury Board. These 
are the approvals required for a project to enter into the definition or implementation stages of 
procurement and access Vote 5 project funding. 7 Over the last decade, the number of approvals 
received by DND annually has fallen dramatically. Relative to 2009/2010, DND secured only half 
as many combined approvals in 2014/2015. In 2015/2016 the number of approvals that DND secured 
declined further still, dropping to roughly 40 per cent of the number obtained in 2009/2010. 
This significant change in the number of secured approvals correlates closely with a significant 
change in DND’s spending on Vote 5 capital projects. From 2005/2006 to 2010/2011, annual 
spending on capital increased dramatically in real terms (see Figure 1). This was the result of a 
significant infusion of capital funding provided through the federal budgets in 2005, 2006 and then 
locked in place with the 2008 budget and the Canada First Defence Strategy. These cumulative 
changes provided DND with the funding to engage in a major recapitalization. The general trend 
of increased spending on capital stopped in 2010/2011, however. Subsequently, capital spending has 
declined, dropping by more than $1 billion annually, in real terms. 
This general significant decline in capital spending since 2010/2011 has coincided with DND’s 
inability to make use of the fiscal room set aside for defence. While the 2016 budget did not have a 
major focus on defence, it followed two previous federal budgets (in 2012 and 2014) in announcing 
that funds set aside for DND to purchase capital equipment would be shifted into the future. 
Budget 2016 announced that a total of $3.7 billion of DND’s accrual space that had been set aside 
in the fiscal framework between 2015/2016 and 2020/2021 was removed from that timeframe and 
redistributed between 2021/2022 and 2044/2045. The accrual space is the budgeting construct 
introduced with the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy that sets aside a portion of the federal 
5 
http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=31300 
6 
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/president-treasury-board-canada-mandate-letter 
7 Vote 5 capital expenditures encompass: “A capital expenditures vote is used when the aggregate of capital expenditures 
equal or exceed $5 million. Capital expenditures are those made for the acquisition or development of items that are 
classified as tangible capital assets as defined by Government accounting policies. For example, the acquisition of 
real property, infrastructure, machinery or equipment, or for purposes of constructing or developing assets, where an 
organization expects to draw upon its own labour and materials, or employs professional services or other services or goods. 
Expenditure items in a Capital Expenditures Vote are for items that generally exceed $10,000; although an organization may 
select a reduced threshold to be applied to different capital classes.” http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/hgw-cgf/finances/pgs-pdg/
gepme-pdgbpd/20162017/me-bpd01-eng.asp#toc1 
3fiscal framework to account for the annual depreciation expenses associated with the purchases of 
major defence equipment.8
The accounting for individual projects in the accrual space is somewhat comparable to the way 
a home mortgage works. For most people, the full purchase cost of a new home does not count 
against their monthly budget, but rather only their mortgage payments do, which spreads the total 
cost of the home over several years. To relate this back to the capital equipment project, while the 
bank (in this case the Canadian government) has to make the funds available to pay the seller in 
full for the cost of a house (in the equipment case a ship, vehicle or aircraft), a homeowner only 
pays the bank their monthly mortgage payment (for DND, an annual depreciation charge for its 
ships, vehicles or aircraft). While a potential homeowner might have the money set aside in their 
bank account to make monthly mortgage payments (again, DND in this instance), if a real estate 
agent can’t actually close a deal for a house (or Canada’s defence procurement system cannot 
actually buy a ship, vehicle or aircraft on schedule), the homeowner does not need to make a 
mortgage payment (again, in DND’s case, it does not need to account for depreciation expenses in 
the accrual space).
The accrual space is managed like a portfolio of mortgages, within an overall budgetary limit. As of 
Budget 2016, DND’s total accrual space for capital was around $700 million, and projected to reach 
$3 billion by about 2021/2022.9 Within this accrual envelope, DND manages a number of projects, 
but must ensure that their cumulative depreciation charges do not exceed the funding available.
The 2016 budget provided significant clarity about this issue by publishing, for the first time, a 
table depicting both the previous and revised profile of DND’s accrual space. It shows that DND’s 
current annual amortization charges are roughly $2 billion annually lower than the accrual space 
set aside by the Department of Finance. The Canada First Defence Strategy created the accrual 
space construct for DND in 2008 on the premise that DND could quickly recapitalize all of its 
combat fleets. Making full use of the accrual space available for this recapitalization would have 
then, and still does today, required several tens of billions worth of capital equipment purchases and 
the Canadian Armed Forces taking delivery of that equipment, in just a few years. While DND has 
made progress on this recapitalization (as detailed below), the full scope of planned reinvestment 
simply has not happened on the schedule to which the accrual space was originally aligned. 
Progress on Priorities
In its 2015 campaign platform, the Liberal Party of Canada made three specific pledges with 
respect to defence procurement: “We will not buy the F-35 stealth fighter-bomber”; “We will 
immediately launch an open and transparent competition to replace the CF-18 fighter aircraft”; 
and “We will make investing in the Royal Canadian Navy [RCN] a top priority.”10 The latter two 
promises were included directly in the mandate letter that directed Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan 
to “launch an open and transparent competition to replace the CF-18 fighter aircraft, focusing on 
options that match Canada’s defence needs” and “invest in strengthening the Navy, while meeting 
the commitments that were made as part of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy.”11 
In its first full year in office, the Trudeau government delivered on the first and third of these 
priorities, and committed to launch a competition sometime between the publication of the Defence 
Policy Review, and the end of the government’s first mandate. 
8 The accrual space also set aside funding for the expansion of the military, provided funding for readiness and operations 
and support. 
9 
Budget 2017 made further, very significant changes to the accrual space as well.
10 Liberal Party of Canada, A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class (Ottawa: 2015), 70.
11 
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-national-defence-mandate-letter 
4Shipbuilding
One of the government’s first actions on a defence issue in 2016 was the February announcement 
of a proposed change to the procurement strategy for the Canadian surface combatant (CSC). 
Originally, the project was slated to hold two competitions: one to select a warship designer and 
a second to source a combat systems integrator. This process was oriented around the need to 
produce a purpose-built warship for the RCN, because its requirements could not have been met 
by any existing designs. Over the course of the requirements review and reconciliation process for 
CSC that occurred during 2015, the requirements underwent significant evolution, which opened 
the possibility of holding a competition for an existing design that with some changes could meet 
Canada’s needs. At the same time, it became apparent that the plan to design a bespoke warship 
would create a nearly two-year delay between the completion of the last Arctic and offshore patrol 
ship (AOPS) and the construction of the first CSC. In addition to delaying the introduction of the 
new capability, this would be problematic for achieving the intent of the National Shipbuilding 
Procurement Strategy (NSPS) that the shipyards maintain a stable workforce while executing their 
program of work.
To address these issues, in February 2016 the government announced a proposed change to the 
procurement strategy to select an existing military off-the-shelf design that would then undergo 
some customization to adapt it to meet Canadian needs. According to an official announcement of 
the change, the Crown expects that construction on the CSC could start “up to two years sooner than 
originally planned,”12 while also reducing technical and financial risk associated with the project. 
The extent to which this can be achieved remains to be seen. In testimony to Parliament, executives 
from Irving Shipbuilding, the project’s prime contractor, stated that as of February 2017, under a 
best case scenario, the gap between when production on the AOPS ends and CSC starts was 18 
months. They went on to express concern that the gap would lengthen without improvements in 
government decision-making. Further, they also indicated that the lower risk associated with the 
new procurement strategy would be imperilled if the proposed designs were changed significantly. 
Changing between 10 and 15 per cent of the ship was identified as the range at which the project 
would switch from modifying an existing design to effectively creating a new one, with the 
increased risks associated with doing so.13
Subsequently, the government also announced steps to improve its handling of the shipbuilding 
file. At the CANSEC defence tradeshow in May 2016, Minister of Public Services and Procurement 
Canada (PSPC) Judy Foote announced, without saying so directly, a rebranding of the NSPS as the 
National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS). In so doing, Foote also recognized a number of challenges 
related to the file and announced a number of changes to its management. First, she recognized the 
need for greater expertise and stronger oversight, including securing the advice of a shipbuilding 
expert, a retired British admiral. In addition to an unspecified clarification of departmental roles 
and responsibilities and mention of regular meetings with the shipyards, Foote also mentioned 
the establishment of the ad hoc cabinet committee on defence procurement (the committee was 
subsequently established on a permanent basis in August). Second, the announcement stated 
the government’s shipbuilding workforce would be increased, and subsequent public statements 
indicate that this will see a “doubling and probably tripling”14 of the marine procurement 
workforce at PSPC. Third, Foote announced that the government would improve its process for 
budgeting, recognizing past deficiencies in that area. A key aspect of that improvement is that a 
12 
Evidence, House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence. 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, No. 35. Feb. 2, 2017.
13 
Evidence, House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence. 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, No. 28. Nov. 17, 2016. 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=e&Mode=1&Parl=42&Ses=1&DocId=8730424 
14 
Evidence, House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence. 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, No. 28. Nov. 17, 2016.
5new cost estimate for CSC will not be released until a build contract is signed.15 The fourth aspect 
announced related to better performance monitoring of the shipyards’ improvements. The fifth 
component promised better communications of the shipbuilding file. To that end, a status report on 
NSS through December 2015 was released.16 
Finally, on Oct. 27, following a summer of extensive industry engagements, the request for 
proposals (RFP) for CSC was released to the 12 firms qualified as potential bidders. Bids were 
originally due April 27, 2017 a deadline subsequenty extended.17 A definition contract was 
originally anticipated by mid-2018.18 The release of the RFP is a critical move forward for the file.
Fighters
Starting at the same CANSEC trade show, Sajjan began laying out the government’s proposed way 
forward with fighter aircraft as well. He referred to what he described as an emerging operational 
capability gap with respect to fighter aircraft that he inherited from the Harper government. 
This situation had left him uncomfortable “risk-managing a gap between our NORAD and 
NATO commitments and the number of fighters available for operations”19 which he found to 
be unacceptable. Shortly thereafter, several media reports emerged suggesting that the Trudeau 
government would make a sole-source purchase of Boeing Super Hornets.20 When asked about the 
subject during Question Period, the prime minister replied that “the Conservatives threw their lot 
in with a plane that does not work and is a long way from ever working,”21 referring apparently to 
the F-35.
In July 2016, the Trudeau government announced that it would engage in consultations with 
potential fighter aircraft manufacturers over the summer. A detailed questionnaire was sent to 
manufacturers July 7, with response due by July 29. Engagements with allied governments were 
conducted as part of this effort during July and August.22 
On Nov. 22, the government announced a twofold approach to acquiring fighters. First, it stated 
that it would launch, within its first mandate, an open and transparent competition to replace the 
CF-18 fleet. As well, it will “explore the acquisition of 18 new Super Hornet aircraft to supplement 
the CF-18s until the permanent replacement arrives.”23 To the latter end, it will engage in talks with 
Boeing to determine if the 18 proposed aircraft can be acquired at “a cost, time, level of capability, 
and economic value that are acceptable to Canada.”24
15 A new estimate was provided when the Liberal’s new defence policy Strong Secure Engaged was released.
16 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1073779 
17 
As of Aug 13, 2017 when this paper was finalized, a bid submission deadline had not been established.
18 
http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/nouvelles-news/2016-10-27-eng.html 
19 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-needs-new-fighter-jets-now-defence-minister-says/article30172969/ 
20 
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/trudeau-says-f-35s-are-far-from-working-as-liberals-tories-
spar-over-fighter-jet-strategies 
21 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=42&Ses=1&DocId=8338219 
22 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-equipment/cf-18-replacement.page 
23 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?crtr.sj1D=&crtr.mnthndVl=11&mthd=advSrch&crtr.dpt1D=6670&nid=1158669&crtr.
lc1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.yrStrtVl=2016&crtr.kw=&crtr.dyStrtVl=24&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVl=8&crtr.page=1&crtr.
yrndVl=2016&crtr.dyndVl=22 
24 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?mthd=tp&crtr.page=1&nid=1158689&crtr.tp1D=930 Boeing’s launch of a complaint 
to the US commerce department subsequently disrupted these efforts. At CANSEC 2017, Sajjan exorciated Boeing in his 
keynote speech, describing their actions as not those of a trusted defence partner. Since, the Trudeau government has stated 
that they will not officially speak with the company.
6The move to acquire an interim fighter fleet will employ an exemption to the Canadian 
government contracts regulations that the Harper government created in 2015. The exception 3(1)
(g), is specifically for “a contract whose purpose is, for operational reasons, to fulfil an interim 
requirement for defence supplies or services or to ensure defence logistical capabilities on an 
interim basis, and any related contract.”25 This amendment exempts contracts that fall within those 
parameters from the regulations, which among other things, define narrowly the conditions under 
which a procurement can proceed without soliciting bids. Without using this exception to the 
contracting regulations, the government must solicit bids unless one of the following criteria apply: 
i) the need is one of pressing emergency; ii) the contract is low value ($25,000 unless very specific 
conditions apply); iii) it is not in the public interest to solicit bids; or iv) only one entity is capable of 
performing the contract. By invoking the exemption to the contracting regulations, the government 
is not required to solicit bids, or even to justify why it is not. 
According to RCAF commander Lt.-Gen. Mike Hood, the fighter capability gap which has 
necessitated the interim capability is the result of a Trudeau government policy change requiring 
the RCAF to be able to meet both NORAD and NATO operational requirements simultaneously.26 
Previously, governments of the day had made commitments to both NORAD and NATO that would 
require more aircraft than are actually available for use if both were called upon simultaneously. 
Past governments had risk-managed this issue, by accepting that Canada would simply not be able 
to deliver upon both commitments to their fullest extents concurrently. 
While the government’s moves on CSC have been largely praised, several aspects of the fighter 
decision have been criticized. Key among these criticisms is the assertion by several critics that 
the capability gap upon which the interim purchase is premised does not in fact exist. Hood 
provided some clarification around this issue in testimony to Parliament when he stated that the 
gap is the result of a Liberal government policy change to mandate that the NORAD and NATO 
commitments be met concurrently.
Additional concerns have been raised about the budgetary and personnel implications of acquiring 
an interim fighter fleet. Defence officials have subsequently indicated that the funding set aside in 
the fiscal framework for the permanent replacement of the CF-18 will be used to cover the costs of 
the interim fighter project,27 but this leaves open the question of where funding for the full time CF-
18 will come from.28 This also raises the issue of whether the costs, which are unknown, but which 
leaked information indicates could range between $5 billion to $7 billion, are worth the return on 
investment.29 Further, the difficulty of creating two separate fleets presents a number of problems 
for the RCAF which already has difficulty maintaining sufficient numbers of pilots and skilled 
maintainers for its single existing fighter fleet.30 
Another significant point of criticism is the announced timeframe for the competition to 
permanently replace Canada’s CF-18s, as public statements indicate that this could take as long 
as five years to complete.31 That it could take an additional five years to competitively procure 
new fighter aircraft after a year of review by the Trudeau government, following multiple years of 
study by an independent secretariat under the Harper government’s seven-point plan, following its 
2010 decision to purchase the F-35 (which came after years of examination and participation in the 
25 
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-87-402/page-1.html#h-3 
26 Evidence, The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Nov. 28, 2016.
27 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/sen/committee/421/NFFN/52946-E.HTM 
28 
Strong Secure Engaged did not clarify this matter, as no budget for interim fighters was identified, but defence did benefit in 
the new policy from a long term budget increase, which presumably accommodates that purchase.
29 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/fighter-jet-purchase-super-hornets-1.3956306 
30 
https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/super-hornets-eh-canadian-airpower-falls-short-on-north-american-defense/ 
31 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/fighter-jet-purchase-announcement-1.3862210 
7Joint Strike Fighter project), is simply difficult to understand. This is likely the clearest evidence 
yet of diverging expectations regarding defence procurement between government officials and 
outside observers. While an additional five years of work may simply be how long government 
officials believe it will take to move the project forward successfully, it is difficult to view this as a 
reasonable timeframe given all the previous years of work on the file. Notwithstanding the criticism 
on this file, the Trudeau government has at least decided on a way forward on a file that has been 
in limbo since 2012. In doing so, however, it has clearly broken its campaign commitment to 
“immediately launch” a competitive process. 
Mixed Progress on the Defence Procurement Strategy
While the government’s two priority projects consumed much of the procurement system’s time 
and attention in 2016, throughout the year work to implement the defence procurement strategy, 
launched in February 2014, continued with mixed success. The most significant factor in this regard 
is that the Trudeau government appears to have embraced the strategy in practice and execution, 
even if it does not mention it by name.32 Public statements by Foote and the parliamentary 
secretaries for both DND and PSPSC have endorsed the threefold focus on economic leveraging, 
delivering the right equipment to the armed forces, and doing so in a timely manner.33
On April 1, DND’s increased delegated authority, one of the key tenets of the Defence Procurement 
Strategy, finally took effect, with DND’s delegation increasing to $400,000. As well, during the 
year, work to advance the strategy’s economic leveraging pillar advanced notably. Innovation, 
Science and Economic Development’s (ISED) Canadian industry study contracted to Avascent 
progressed, with its report examining key industrial capabilities submitted to government in 
March 2017. Similarly, DND’s Supplementary Estimates B for 2016-2017 contained a $3 million 
transfer from DND to ISED to establish “an office to study defence analytics and for value-added 
propositions related to defence procurement.”34 It is unclear where exactly the wider effort to better 
understand the defence industry is leading, but public comments indicate that the focus of the 
industrial and technological benefits (ITB) policy will be on supporting existing segments of the 
defence industrial base.35
The other aspect of the Defence Procurement Strategy that is fully implemented is the independent 
review panel for defence acquisitions. In its first annual report, the panel noted that between 
June 2015 and 2016 it met 14 times and reviewed 17 projects, providing advice to the minister 
on four of them.36 Those projects reviewed include: the Canadian surface combatant, the logistic 
vehicle modernization, common heavy equipment replacement, joint unmanned surveillance and 
targeting system, naval large tug, future fighter capability, Halifax heating plant, RCN intelligence, 
surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance unmanned aircraft system, the CF-18 life 
extension, enhanced recovery capability, land vehicles crew training system, Griffon limited life 
extension and future aircrew training. Anecdotal comments from some working in the procurement 
system at DND indicate that the panel is having a positive impact by bolstering the department’s 
credibility with other government departments. The panel’s first report indicates that it will 
measure its performance on the appropriateness of requirements it validates, the usefulness of its 
advice and how well it enhances confidence with decision-makers and improves credibility with 
32 Further endorsement came in Strong Secure Engaged which restated many of the original DPS initiatives under the new 
policy’s procurement session.
33 
The Honourable Judy Foote, Speech to CANSEC; John McKay and Leona Alleslev, “Remarks to Deliverology of Defence 
Procurement.”
34 Evidence, Standing Committee on National Defence. 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, No. 32. Dec. 1, 2016.
35 
Evidence, House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence. 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, No. 28. Nov. 17, 2016.
36 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/business-how-to-do/irpda-2015-2016-annual-report-.pdf 
8industry. It is unclear if this assessment will include any quantitative metrics for evaluating whether 
the introduction of the IRPDA has improved the rate at which projects reviewed by the panel pass 
through the wider procurement system. 
Other key aspects of the Defence Procurement Strategy and associated efforts made little or no 
progress during 2016. Although DND continued its effort to hire additional procurement staff in 
the materiel group, and remains in the process of hiring more at the time of writing, through 2016 
DND had not successfully expanded its ranks by a couple hundred net positions.37 In contrast to the 
mixed success on that front, there was no publicly evident progress on either effort to streamline 
the defence procurement process in 2016. The project approval process review at National Defence, 
launched in 2012, remained unsigned throughout 2016.38 Similarly, the government-wide effort 
to streamline defence procurement initiated as part of the Defence Procurement Strategy in 2014, 
made no publicly detectable progress in 2016. To be clear, this is not to say that some procurements 
did not move forward in 2016, but simply that the efforts to streamline the procurement process did 
not make any progress that was publicly visible.
While not strictly part of the Defence Procurement Strategy, PSPSC has been moving forward 
with other aspects of procurement modernization and improvement, following Foote’s mandate 
letter direction to “Modernize procurement practices so that they are simpler, less administratively 
burdensome, deploy modern comptrollership, and include practices that support our economic 
policy goals, including green and social procurement.”39 The department issued an RFP in April 
for an electronic procurement solution designed to “modernize public procurement practices so 
that they are simpler, less administratively burdensome and deploy modern comptrollership.”40 The 
department is also examining its contracting terms and conditions to see if they can be simplified. 
As well, it is adopting flexible bid evaluation, allowing suppliers the opportunity to receive an initial 
assessment on a bid with the intent of preventing bids from being rejected due to minor reasons.41 
Uncertainty Over the Defence Policy Review
Finally, throughout 2016 significant effort was directed towards renewing Canadian defence policy. 
In its 2015 federal election platform, the Liberal Party of Canada acknowledged that the Canada 
First Defence Strategy was “underfunded and out of date”42 and pledged to draft a new defence 
policy. The commitment was subsequently incorporated into Sajjan’s mandate letter that directed 
him to “Conduct an open and transparent review process to create a new defence strategy for 
Canada.”43
With respect to defence procurement, the key issue that had to be addressed during the Defence 
Policy Review was rationalizing DND’s intended procurements with the capital funding available 
to implement them. Heading into the review, the problem was twofold. First, the budgets for 
several major projects that have been approved and included in DND’s investment plan (the long-
term planning document required by the Treasury Board secretariat),44 but which were not yet into 
37 At the time of writing, this appears to have been achieved, and the new defence policy mandates DND to add “more than 
60” additional positions. 
38 It did receive approval in early 2017, however.
39 
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-public-services-and-procurement-mandate-letter 
40 
https://buyandsell.gc.ca/procurement-data/tender-notice/PW-XN-111-30112 
41 
Evidence, House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence. 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, No. 28. Nov. 17, 2016.
42 Liberal Party of Canada, A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class (Ottawa: 2015).
43 Mandate letter.
44 
Canada. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. “Policy on Investment Planning - Assets and Acquired Services,” accessed 
July 30, 2014, http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=18225&section=text.
9contract, were inadequate. This had been acknowledged explicitly for CSC.45 The same situation also 
applied to multiple other projects that had their budgets established almost a decade ago, prior to, or 
with, the publication of the Canada First Defence Strategy, such as the joint unmanned surveillance 
and target acquisition system. One of DND’s key activities for the Defence Policy Review was a re-
costing of all of its projects, resulted in a number of budgets being seriously revised. 
The second funding problem was that a large number of prospective projects were not funded in 
the investment plan at all. This was primarily a problem for large projects that would be funded 
from the accrual envelope over the medium and long term. As outlined above, in the short term, 
problems with the procurement system are limiting DND’s ability to make use of the funds it has. 
Beyond this time horizon, however, funding limitations have precluded many of DND’s planned 
recapitalizations from happening. 
The funding shortfall was acute prior to the release of the new defence policy. Figure 2 frames 
the magnitude of the problem as it then existed. It also provides estimates for both the low and 
high ranges of total capital expenditures outlined in the total potential equipment acquisitions in 
the Defence Acquisition Guide (DAG). These estimates were calculated by taking the total data 
presented in the DAG, including known project budgets, and removing those projects known to be 
funded.46 The remaining list of projects represents potential acquisitions for which funding in the 
investment plan was likely not assured prior to the release of Strong Secure Engaged, ranging from 
a low estimate of roughly $40 billion to a high estimate of almost $70 billion.
These columns indicating potential demand are set against the likely room available in DND’s 
investment plan as of spring 2016. At that time, less than $20 billion in available investment plan 
room was available for capital acquisitions, as well as any needed funding for operating and 
sustainment costs, and room for possible cost escalation due to inflation, exchange rate fluctuations 
and other contingencies. Altogether, this suggests that there was two to three times more demand 
for capital funding than available room in DND’s investment plan.47
A critical aspect of the Defence Policy Review was thus to bring DND’s list of potential projects 
and the supply of available funding into closer alignment, either by providing policy direction 
that reduced the number of projects proposed by DND or providing it with additional funding by 
increasing the capital funding available to the department. Thankfully, the new policy seems to 
have done both, by increasing the supply of funding and itemizing which projects are included as 
part of the new policy, and which are not.
SECTION 2: PROJECT STATUS REPORT PART 1
The projects in Annex 1 are those listed in DND’s status reports on major Crown projects. The 
first page for each project itemizes the estimated project costs for the acquisition component of 
the procurement where this information was obtainable.48 It also includes a project description 
and explanation of variance, which describe the project and articulate why deviations from the 
original schedule have occurred. The second page records the project’s progress according to the 
45 
Canada. Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Feasibility of Budget for Acquisition of Two Joint Support Ships 
(Ottawa: 2013); James Cudmore. “Warship Cost could Rise to $30B, Vice-Admiral Mark Norman Confirms,” last modified 
Dec. 2, 2015, accessed Dec. 2, 2015, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/warships-30-billion-navy-mark-norman-1.3347145.
46 
This removed the following projects from the total: the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship; Canadian Surface Combatant; 
Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft; Future Fighter Capability; Joint Support Ship; Joint Unmanned Surveillance and 
Target Acquisition System; Point Defence Missile System Upgrade; Underwater Warfare Suite Upgrade. 
47 
Confidential interviews
48 
This entry has been revised to provide the revised estimated total cost for the project reported in the 2015-2016 
departmental performance report, unless otherwise indicated. This provides a more consistent basis for reporting project 
costs than the project budget category previously employed.
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major procurement milestones published in the document. In the “Initial” column, the first publicly 
available data on the project are included.49 The “2014,” “2015,” and “2016” columns provide data 
from the departmental performance reports from 2013/2014, 2014/2015 and 2015/2016 respectively. 
These four columns in combination are intended to demonstrate progress since the project was 
initially included for publication, and then specifically progress over the last two years. Dates 
highlighted in green indicate that a project is proceeding faster than indicated the year prior, those 
highlighted in red indicate the project is moving slower, and those not highlighted indicate the 
project is on schedule. A dotted line through the middle of this page indicates that the program was 
significantly changed after its initial inclusion, either through cancellation or a project reset and 
thus the data below the line are applicable to the revised project schedule only. Where a checkmark 
symbol () is entered, this indicates that the milestone was achieved on the schedule previously 
indicated. Finally, this section concludes with a part specifically indicating progress in 2016.50 
Of the 25 projects listed in Annex 1, two had no data entered in 2016 – the Future Fighter 
Capability and Joint Unmanned Surveillance and Target Acquisition System projects. Of the 
remaining 23, a comparison of their project milestones showed that in 2016, one was early 
compared to the previous year’s schedule indicated, 10 were proceeding on schedule and 12 
projects were late relative to what the previous year’s schedule indicated. A full listing is presented 
in Table 1.
These individual project descriptions reveal that every one of the projects examined has 
experienced a delay in achieving at least one published milestone, with the exception of the 
Maritime Helicopter Project (a project which has experienced multiple major contract amendments 
causing delays) and the CP-140 Aurora Incremental Modernization/Structural Life Extension 
Project on which there are only two years of data. None of the projects that had a single Full 
Operational Capability date achieved that milestone on schedule, although the Halifax-Class 
Modernization/Frigate Life Extension and Underwater Warfare Suite Upgrade projects remain on 
track to do so.
Only the acquisition of the fifth C-17 as part of the Airlift Capability Project – Strategic, Halifax-
Class Modernization/Frigate Life Extension, Mercury Global and Submarine Capability Life 
Extension projects achieved IOC on schedule and the latter’s schedule was set nine years after the 
vessels were acquired. 
49 Of note, due to the age of some projects there were data problems obtaining consistent records for the older projects in this 
Annex. Only the status reports on major Crown projects published since 2006/2007 are available on the DND website. The 
author used any data provided in DND’s Report on Plans and Priorities from previous years to supplement this information 
where possible, but this still presented an inconsistent set of data entries for the “Initial” column for older projects.
50 The data used in this Annex are drawn from open sources. It should be recognized that there is an information asymmetry 
between the projects that have deviated the least and the most from their original schedules. Generally, only the most 
complex projects with the highest level of risk, and thus the ones most likely to be delayed, become the subjects of these 
audits. There is thus generally more information to explain delay than there is to explain why a project remained on 
schedule.
 
Similarly, there was significant variation in terms of which milestones the projects reported, and when they first reported 
them. As an example, the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship Project published an initial operating capability (IOC) target the 
first time the project was mentioned in the status report on major Crown projects. The submarine capability life extension, 
however, did not publish an IOC date until nine years after the project was first detailed in the Reports on Plans and 
Priorities in 1999, the same year the contract for the vessels was signed. This type of information disparity therefore 
precludes systematic comparisons and analysis across these projects.
 
Further, not all schedule milestones are equally important, with project close-out; for instance, less important than the 
others. Once a project hits full operational capability (FOC), the most significant work, requiring the most staff effort, has 
been completed. Often after this stage, the remaining tasks will be transferred over to the equipment program managers in 
the materiel group. Often, closing out a project can take significant time after FOC is achieved due to the need to receive 
all invoices, and finalize infrastructure, force generation and supply chain arrangements. The Canadian Search and Rescue 
Helicopter Project, for instance, reached FOC in 2004, but has not yet been closed out. 
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For 2016 specifically, the following progress was noted:
• In March 2016 the first keel unit for the AOPS, the HMCS Harry DeWolf, was moved into 
place. The second keel unit followed in May. In July the second of four main propulsion 
diesel engines and generators was installed.
• In February a proposed change to the procurement strategy for the Canadian surface 
combatant was announced, which was confirmed in June.
• On Oct. 27, the request for proposal for the Canadian surface combatant was released.
• A contract for 16 fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft was awarded to Airbus Defence and 
Space on Dec. 1, 2016.
• In November 2016, the government announced that it would enter into negotiations with 
Boeing to purchase an interim fleet of 18 Super Hornet aircraft and that an open competition 
for a permanent fleet would be launched during the current mandate.
• The last frigate to go through the Halifax-class modernization/frigate life extension, HMCS 
Toronto, completed its upgrade on schedule in November 2016.
• In August 2016 the government announced that it would be purchasing a small unmanned 
aerial vehicle from the United States Navy through a foreign military sale.
• In March 2016 a $35.4 million contract was announced for long lead items for the joint 
support ship.
• In January 2016 a request for information for the joint unmanned surveillance and target 
acquisition system projects was released and responses were provided to the government 
April 15.
• In 2016, the number of vehicles for the Light Armoured Vehicle III Upgrade Project inducted 
into production rose from 185 to 420, the number produced increased from 143 to 332 and the 
number fielded to operational units has risen from 64 to 262.
• As of December 2016, Canada had accepted 10 maritime helicopters. Initial cadre training 
started in May 2016. The contract was amended Jan. 28, 2016 and again Aug. 23, 2016. Testing 
for ship’s helicopter and operating limits was conducted in the first four months of 2016 on 
HMCS Halifax. Block 2 critical design review was successfully completed in April 2016.
• In November 2016 the government received final delivery of the last kitted shelters for the 
Medium Support Vehicle System Project on time and on budget.
• The first medium-to-heavy lift helicopter pilot, flight engineer and load master graduated 
from the Garrison Petawawa Operational Training Centre Feb. 12, 2016. The aircraft 
deployed on their first domestic humanitarian deployment on Operation LENTUS in 
response to the massive Fort McMurray wildfires.
• In July 2016, a request for information was released for the strategic deployable terminals 
component of Mercury Global, followed by a notice of proposed procurement in October.
• A second round of reliability testing for the tactical armoured patrol vehicle was completed in 
April 2016. Vehicle deliveries began Aug. 12, 2016.
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SECTION 3: PROJECT STATUS REPORT PART 2
In addition to the detailed project descriptions published in the status reports on major Crown projects, 
DND also annually publishes procurement data in its DAG. This section analyzes this information. 
The 2016 edition of the DAG comprised six categories: land systems, naval systems, aerospace 
systems, joint and other systems, services, and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command 
services. The analysis here concentrates only on the first three categories, denoted as army, navy 
and RCAF in the tables below. Because the guide’s intent is to provide information about future 
equipment needs for the military, most of the initiatives listed have not yet received government 
approval and have therefore been subject to change or removal. Recognizing this, only those 
projects that each of the services judged to be active were examined. 
Of note, the AOPS, CSC, FWSAR, future fighter capability, JSS, JUSTAS and UWSU projects 
were listed in the 2015 and 2016 DAGs; in addition to the projects included in Annex 1, they are 
therefore not discussed in detail below. 
Table 2 compiled data on the 2015 and 2016 entries for the army, navy and RCAF. 2016 entries that 
were new, had been archived, or had changed to absorb another project previously listed elsewhere 
in the 2015 DAG were excluded from this analysis as they did not allow a comparison from 2015 
to 2016. It should be noted that some of these entries had been archived because the projects had 
advanced. For the remaining entries, the project milestones in the 2016 DAG were compared with 
those in the 2015 DAG. As with the projects listed above, they were categorized as either early, on 
schedule or late. 
A comparison of the 2015 and 2016 DAG entries shows that in the time between the documents’ 
publication, the RCN’s Maritime Satellite Communications Upgrade and Naval Remote Weapon 
Station projects were awarded contracts, the Point Defence Missile System Upgrade and the 
Underwater Warfare Suite Upgrades received definition approval and the Multi-Role Boat Project 
entered into options analysis. An advanced contract award notice was issued for the RCAF’s 
SONOBUOYs AN/SSQ 62E DICASS contract, the CC-138 Twin Otter life extension and the search 
and rescue mission management system replacements received definition approval, and the CF-
188 life extension 2025 entered into options analysis. The Canadian Army’s Ranger Rifle Project 
entered into contract, and the army received definition approval for the airspace co-ordination 
centre modernization, high risk search capability and LAV operational requirements integration task 
mobility upgrades, with the latter having also entered options analysis between the two reports.
The analysis, presented in Table 2, shows that 24 per cent of the projects analyzed are early, 28 
per cent are on schedule, and 49 per cent are late. Table 3 lists the data presented on the same set 
of potential procurements in the 2015 edition of this report. A comparison of Table 2 and Table 
3 shows a better rate of progress on projects (denoted by them being either early or on schedule) 
between 2015 and 2016 than was the case between 2014 and 2015. The list of projects included in 
this section is provided in Table 4.
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TABLE 1  PROJECTS LISTED IN BOTH THE 2015/2016 AND 2014/2015 DEPARTMENTAL  
PERFORMANCE REPORTS
Project Year-to-Year Status
1. Airlift Capability Project – Strategic Late
2. Airlift Capability Project – Tactical On Schedule
3. Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship Late
4. Canadian Cryptographic Modernization Program Late
5. Canadian Search and Rescue Helicopter Project Late
6. Canadian Surface Combatant Project Early
7. CP-140 Aurora Incremental Modernization / Structural Life Extension Projects (New) On Schedule
8. Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft Replacement Project On Schedule
9. Force Mobility Enhancement Project Late
10. Future Fighter Capability No Data
11. Halifax-Class Modernization/Frigate Life Extension On Schedule
12. Land Forces Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance System Late
13. Joint Support Ship Late
14. Joint Unmanned Surveillance and Target Acquisition System No Data
15. Light Armoured Vehicle III Upgrade Project On Schedule
16. Lightweight Towed Howitzer On Schedule
17. Maritime Helicopter Project On Schedule
18. Medium Support Vehicle System Project Late
19. Medium-to-Heavy Lift Helicopter On Schedule
20. Mercury Global Late
21. Protected Military Satellite Communications On Schedule
22. Submarine Capability Life Extension On Schedule
23. Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle Late
24. Tank Replacement Project Late
25. Underwater Warfare Suite Upgrade Late
TABLE 2 ACTIVE PROJECT SCHEDULE CHANGE FROM DAG 2015 TO DAG 2016
Service Total Early On Schedule Late
Army 29 9 4 16
Navy 10 3 3 4
RCAF 33 5 13 15
Total 72 17 20 35
 
Project Schedule Change from DAG 2015 to DAG 2016 (%)
Service Total Early On Schedule Late
Army 29 31% 14% 55%
Navy 10 30% 30% 40%
RCAF 33 15% 39% 45%
Total 72 24% 28% 49%
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TABLE 3 ACTIVE PROJECT SCHEDULE CHANGE FROM DAG 2014 - DAG 2015
Service Total Early On Schedule Late
Army 20 0 8 12
Navy 14 2 6 6
RCAF 16 1 5 10
Total 50 3 19 28
 
Active Project Schedule Change from DAG 2014 to DAG 2015 (%)
Service Total Early On Schedule Late
Army 20 0% 40% 60%
Navy 14 14% 43% 43%
RCAF 16 6% 31% 63%
Total 50 6% 38% 56%
TABLE 4 ACTIVE 2016 DAG PROJECTS
Project Options Analysis Definition Approval
Request for 
Proposals
Implementation 
Approval Contract Delivery
Army
84mm Carl Gustaf Upgrade 2019 2023 2024 2025 2025 2026-2036
Advanced IED Detection and Defeat 2019 2020 2023 2023 2024 2026-2036
Advanced Sub-Unit Water Purification 
System   2016 2019 2018 2019 2022
Airspace Co-ordination Center 
Modernization   X 2017 2017 2018 2021
Anti-Tank Guided Missile Replacement 2026-2036 2026-2036 2026-2036 2026-2036 2026-2036 2026-2036
Armoured Combat Support Vehicle 2018 2020 2021 2022 2023 2026-2036
Body Armour Modernization 2018 2020 2022 2022 2023 2026-2036
Bridge and Gap Crossing Modernization 2018 2020 2023 2022 2023 2026-2036
C16 Digital Compass Upgrade 2017 2020 2023 2022 2023 2025
C6 GPMG Modernization     2017 2016 2017 2022
Camp Sustain 2018 2020 2021 2021 2022 2025
CF Land Electronic Warfare 
Modernization   2019 2021 2021 2022 2026-2036
Close Combat Modular Fighting Rig 2017 2019 2022 2022 2023 2026-2036
Combined/Joint Intelligence 
Modernization   2018 2021 2020 2021 2024
Common Heavy Equipment Replacement   2017 2019 2019 2019 2023
Domestic and Arctic Mobility 
Enhancement 2020 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026-2036
Enhanced Recovery Capability   2018 2020 2020 2020 2025
FOO/FAC Modernization 2018 2020 2023 2022 2024 2026-2036
Ground-Based Air and Munitions 
Defence 2018 2020 2022 2022 2023 2026-2036
High Risk Search Capability   X 2017 2016 2017 2020
Indirect Fire Modernization 2018 2020 2022 2022 2023 2025
Joint Deployable HQ and Signal 
Regiment Modernization 2017 2019 2021 2021 2022 2025
Land Command Support System 
Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaisance 
Modernization
2018 2020 2022 2022 2023 2026-2036
15
Project Options Analysis Definition Approval
Request for 
Proposals
Implementation 
Approval Contract Delivery
Land Command Support System Tactical 
Command and Control Information 
System Modernization
2017 2019 2022 2022 2023 2026-2036
Land Command Support System Tactical 
Communications Modernization 2017 2019 2020 2021 2022 2026-2036
Land Vehicles Crew Training System   2016 2017 2019 2019 2024
LAV Operational Requirements 
Integration Task Mobility Upgrade X X 2016 2016 2017 2021
LAV III UP part 2 2016 2017 2018 2019 2019 2022
Light Force Enhancement 2018 2020 2022 2022 2023 2026-2036
Light Utility Vehicle Wheeled 
Recapitalization 2018 2020 2023 2023 2024 2026-2036
Logistics Vehicle Modernization   2017 2019 2020 2020 2025
New Canadian Ranger Rifle *ARCHIVED*  
Night Vision System Modernization 2018 2020 2022 2022 2023 2025
Pistol Replacement 2017 2020 2022 2022 2023 2026-2036
Tactical Power System *NEW* 2018 2020 2022 2022 2023 2025
Unit Weapons Training System 2019 2021 2022 2023 2023 2026-2036
Weapon Effects Simulation Mid-Life 
Upgrade 2016 2018 2019 2020 2020 2024
Air Force
Advanced Short Range Missile 2018 2019 2021 2022 2022 2026-2036
Aircrew Chemical Biological Radiological 
Nuclear Ensemble 2019 2021 2023 2024 2024 2026-2036
Armament Loader Modernization   2016 2017 2016 2017 2019
Canadian Multi-Mission Aircraft 2022 2024 2024 2025 2025 2026-2036
CC-130J Block 8 Upgrade 2018-2020 2019 2021 2021 2022  
CC-138 Twin Otter Life Extension Project     2016 2016 2016 2020
CC144 Consolidation Project 2016 2018 2020 2020 2020 2022
CC-144/150 Missile Warning and Infrared 
Countermeasures Project 2017 2019 2020 2021 2021 2025
CC-150 Life Extension 2017 2018 2019 2019 2020 2024
CF-188 Life Extension 2025   2016 2017 2018 2018  
CF-188 Training Enhancements 2019 2022 2023 2024 2024 2026-2036
CH-149 Cormorant Mid-Life Upgrade 2016 2017 2018 2018 2019  
Complex Weapon 2017 2019 2019 2020 2020 2025
CT-114 Life Extension Beyond 2020 2016 2017 2018 2019 2019 2023
Fighter Lead in Training 2017 2020 2019 2019 2019 2026-2036
Fighter Training Enhancements 2019 2022 2023 2024 2024 2026-2036
Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue 
*ARCHIVED* RFP Closed
Future Aircrew Training   2017 2019-2020 2021 2021 2026-2036
Future Fighter Capability   2017 2017-2019 2018-2020 2018-2020 2026-2036
Griffon Limited Life Extension   2017 2019 2019 2019  
ILS Replcement - assume precision 
landing replace 2019-2020 2021 2025 2022-2024 2025 2026-2036
Joint Unmanned Surveillance and Target 
Acquisition System   2018-2020 2019-2021 2022-2024 2022-2024 2026-2036
Long Range Air-to-Air Missile 2026-2036 2026-2036 2026-2036 2026-2036 2026-2036 2026-2036
Low Collateral Damage Weapon 2017 2018 2018 2019 2019 2021
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile 
Sustainment 2017 2018-2020 2019-2020 2019-2020 2020-2026 2026-2036
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Project Options Analysis Definition Approval
Request for 
Proposals
Implementation 
Approval Contract Delivery
Multi-Band Radio Crypto Modernization 
*NEW* 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2024
Multi-Fleet Air Traffic Management 
Avionics 2018 2019-2021 2023 2023 2024 2026-2036
North Warning System Replacement 2020 2021 2023 2024 2024 2026-2036
Omnibus Aviation Life Support 
Equipment Modernization   2019 2021 2021 2022 2024
Omnibus Support Vehicle Replacement 2 2022 2023 2024 2023 2024 2026-2036
RCAF Footwear Project 2018 2020 2021 2023 2023 2025
Search and Rescue Mission Management 
System Replacement     2017 2017 2017 2020
Snow and Ice Control Capability 
Recapitalization Project 2016 2017 2019 2019 2019 2022
Snowbird Aircraft Replacement Project 2019-2020 2022 2025 2020-2026 2026-2036 2026-2036
Strategic Tanker Transport Capability - 
assume multi-role tanker 2018 2020 2021 2022 2022 2026-2036
Tactical Integrated Command, Control 
and Communications Air   2016 2019 2019 2020 2024
Tactical Reconnaissance Utility 
Helicopter 2021 2024 2026-2036 2026-2036 2026-2036 2026-2036
Utility Transport Aircraft 2018 2020 2021 2021 2022 2026-2036
Voice Switch for Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) Units 2017 2018 2019 2019 2019 2021
Weapon System Trainers   2016 2017 2018 2018 2022
Navy
Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship contract awarded
Canadian Surface Combatant     2016 2021 2021 2036+
Joint Support Ship     2017 2017 2017 2021
Lightweight Torpedo Upgrade     2020 2020 2020 2022-2024
Maritime Satellite Communications 
Upgrade contract awarded
Multi-Role Boat X 2016 2016 2017 2017 2020
Naval Electronic Warfare System Sub 
Surface 2017 2020 2022 2022 2023 2025
Naval Large Tug   2017 2020 2020 2020 2023
Naval Remote Weapon Station contract awarded
Point Defence Missile System 
Upgrade *ARCHIVED*  
RCN Intelligence Surveillance Tracking 
Acquisition and Reconnaissance 
Programme
2016 2018 2019 2020 2021 2021-2025
StrongBow   2016 2020 2020 2021 2026-2036
Submarine Equipment Life Extension 2016 2019 2020-2026 2020-2026 2020-2026 2026-2036
Underwater Warfare Suite Upgrade   X 2016 2017 2017 2024
Legend 
New Project for 2016    
Project Ahead of Last Year’s Schedule    
Project on Last Year’s Schedule    
Project Behind Last Year’s Schedule    
Contract award, RFP, other advance    
Milestone Advanced Since 2015 X          
17
FIGURE 1
 
Figure 1: This chart tracks DND spending on Vote 5 capital, adjusted for inflation using the DND 
economic model. These expenditures are made on a modified cash basis. The captioned activities 
noted on the graph all created changes to the DND budget on an accrual basis. As the section 
earlier notes, however, the two sets of financial information are interlinked. The budgets identified 
below the spending line provided DND with the fiscal base (in accrual terms) that gave individual 
projects a funding source. This allowed projects to move forward and spend money on a cash 
basis, which is depited in the graph. After 2010/2011, the real rate of spending on Vote 5 capital has 
declined. The reduced rate of spending has subsequently delayed the schedule upon which DND 
must depreciate those assets in its accrual space. The reduced rate of spending on a cash basis has 
therefore contributed to DND re-profiling its accrual space into future years.
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FIGURE 2 DND’S ESTIMATED CAPITAL SHORTFALL AS OF 2016 ($B)
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Figure 2: This graphic presents an estimate of the available space in DND’s investment plan as of 
spring 2016, and a high and low estimate for how much demand there was on that available space.
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ANNEX 1: PROJECTS LISTED IN “STATUS REPORT ON TRANSFORMATIONAL 
AND MAJOR CROWN PROJECTS” OF DEPARTMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
REPORT 2015/2016 THAT APPEARED IN A PREVIOUS “STATUS REPORT ON 
TRANSFORMATIONAL AND MAJOR CROWN PROJECTS”.
1. Airlift Capability Project – Strategic 
2. Airlift Capability Project – Tactical
3. Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship 
4. Canadian Cryptographic Modernization Program
5. Canadian Search and Rescue Helicopter Project
6. Canadian Surface Combatant Project 
7. CP-140 Aurora Incremental Modernization / Structural Life Extension Projects (New) 
8. Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft Replacement Project
9. Force Mobility Enhancement Project
10. Future Fighter Capability
11. Halifax-Class Modernization/Frigate Life Extension
12. Land Forces Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance System
13. Joint Support Ship 
14. Joint Unmanned Surveillance and Target Acquisition System 
15. Light Armoured Vehicle III Upgrade Project
16. Lightweight Towed Howitzer
17. Maritime Helicopter Project 
18. Medium Support Vehicle System Project 
19. Medium-to-Heavy Lift Helicopter 
20. Mercury Global 
21. Protected Military Satellite Communications 
22. Submarine Capability Life Extension 
23. Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle 
24. Tank Replacement Project
25. Underwater Warfare Suite Upgrade (New)
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Airlift Capability Project – Strategic
Estimated Total Cost:51 $1.807 billion
Project Description:
This project originated as a Conservative Party of Canada campaign promise in the 2006 election 
to acquire “a fleet of at least three strategic lift aircraft.”52 That scope was subsequently expanded 
to acquiring four aircraft. All aircraft were delivered by 2008 and this initial project was closed out 
after it hit FOC in 2012. The government announced it would acquire a fifth C-17 on Dec. 19, 2014 
using the remaining funding from the acquisition budget of the original aircraft purchase which 
was completed roughly $415 million under budget.53 
Explanation of Variance:
Delivery of the first four aircraft occurred very quickly, as Canada used the advance contract 
award notice (ACAN) process, a procedure used to advertise an intent to sole-source a purchase, 
to procure the C-17 specifically. Canada also bought a virtually unmodified aircraft off an existing 
American production line, with the U.S. government’s concurrence, at a time when Canada needed 
airlift because of operations in Afghanistan. The project was also a personal priority of then-
minister of National Defence Gordon O’Connor, and benefited from the strong working relationship 
between former chief of defence staff Gen. Rick Hillier and then-deputy minister Ward Elcock.54 
The in-service support (the activities required to sustain the operation of a military fleet over 
its lifetime) arrangements secured for the fleet tapped into the existing worldwide arrangements 
established for the American C-17 fleet, facilitating a rapid acquisition. 
Despite the speed of implementation, FOC of the original four aircraft was delayed due to 
complexities associated with transitioning to the in-service support arrangements, which required 
the full availability of infrastructure at Canadian Forces Base Trenton.55
The extremely rapid acquisition of the fifth aircraft is attributable to similar dynamics. Boeing had 
built 10 additional C-17s, “white-tailed”56 in that they had no identified customer in mind. Canada 
therefore purchased an existing aircraft, already produced, without any modifications.
51 This report cites the “estimated total cost” for projects, rather than published project budgets or contract values to provide 
a standardized set of costs. The government is otherwise inconsistent in delineating what costs are captured in other news 
releases or backgrounders. Where available, contract costs are also published. All figures are those published as “revised 
estimated total cost” in the Status Report on Projects Operating with Specific Treasury Board Approval, for 2015/2016. 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-departmental-performance/2016-projects-operating-with-specific-treasury-
board-approval.page Accessed Dec. 1, 2016. This captures the four components of Vote 5 funding: Procurement costs of the 
acquisition (equipment platform/system/fleet and associated infrastructure); integrated logistics support (nominally two-
year spares initial provisioning, training development, technical data packages, simulators, etc., – will vary from project 
to project); Project Management Office costs to include project staff SWE /military pay, travel, training, office space, 
contracted support, etc.; and GST.
52 
Conservative Party of Canada, “Conservatives Call for Boost to Canadian Forces,” Dec. 19, 2005.
53 Canada, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Increased Air Power for the Royal Canadian 
Air Force - Fifth CC-177 Globemaster to Increase RCAF Airlift Capability,” Dec. 19, 2014. http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.
do?nid=916009, DPR 2013/2014
54 
Rick Hillier, A Soldier First, (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2008).
55 
RPP 2010-2011
56 
Nigel Pittaway, “Boeing: Five C-17As Still for Sale,” Defence News, April 23, 2015 http://www.defensenews.com/story/
defense/air-space/support/2015/04/23/australia-c17-boeing-air-force-globemaster/26137493/ 
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Major Milestones: Initial57 2014 2015 2016
Memorandum to Cabinet  June 2006 
Effective Project Approval  June 2006 
ACAN Notice July 2006  
Contract Award  Feb. 2007 
First Delivery Aug. 2007 
IOC  Spring 2008 Oct. 2008 
FOC  Summer 2009  Dec. 2012 
--------------The Initial Project Closed After Reaching FOC for the First 4 Aircraft--------------
Amended Project Approval Dec. 201458 
IOC 5th Aircraft April 201559 March 2015 
FOC 5th Aircraft Aug. 201560 Sept. 2015 
Project Close-Out Dec. 201561 March 2016  2021
Progress in 2016:
No Information Publicly Available. 
57 This Annex is compiled primarily using information provided in the “Status Report on Transformational and Major Crown 
Projects,” section of the Department of National Defence Departmental Performance Report (DPR), supplemented with 
information from the section by the same name in the Department of National Defence Report on Plans and Priorities 
(RPP). In the interest of brevity, most citations to these two reports employ the abbreviations RPP or DPR, and indicate 
the relevant fiscal year. Unless specified by additional footnotes, the information in the column “2014” is from the DPR 
2013/2014, that from “2015” from DPR 2014/2015 and “2016” from DPR 2015/2016. Information in the “Initial” column is 
from the footnote next to the word “Initial”, unless otherwise specified. For the Airlift Capability Project – Strategic, the 
information in the “Initial” column is from DPR 2006/2007, unless otherwise indicated.
58 RPP 2015/2016
59 RPP 2015/2016
60 RPP 2015/2016
61 RPP 2015/2016
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Airlift Capability Project – Tactical
Estimated Total Cost: $3.068 billion
Project Description:
This project replaced the oldest members of the RCAF’s fleet of C-130 Hercules aircraft. A 
commitment to do so first appeared in the 2005 budget, and it was reiterated in the 2005 Defence 
Policy Statement. It was first brought forward for cabinet approval in the fall of 2005 as a sole-
source procurement for the C-130J, but this strategy was rejected.62 
This project was named as part of the Conservative Party of Canada’s 2006 election platform, 
which committed to the “replacement of Canada’s tactical airlift fleet of C-130 Hercules 
aircraft”.63 The project entered the implementation stage with the December 2007 contract award 
to Lockheed Martin Corporation for 17 C-130J aircraft. Aircraft deliveries began in May 2010 
and were completed by May 2012. The contract was subsequently amended in December 2009 
to include provisions for in-service support, in February 2010 for maintenance training systems, 
and in November 2013 for the Block 7.0 avionics modification required to satisfy final project 
deliverables.64 The first CC-130J entered the Block 7.0 modification line in January 2015. Fleet 
embodiment and conversion of the CC-130J training system to the Block 7.0 configuration will 
progress to completion in the 2016-2017 fiscal year.65
Explanation of Variance:
The project was initially delayed due to the transition in government after the 2006 election. 
Thereafter, it had to be reconciled with the Harper government’s priorized acquisition of a strategic 
airlift aircraft. Once the decision was made to proceed with the purchase, it occurred rapidly, in 
part because the C-130J was determined to be the only qualified aircraft following the solicitation 
of interest and qualification, a procedure whereby potential bidders are invited to indicate if they 
are interested and capable of bidding on a procurement. There was also a clear operational need due 
to the advanced age of the fleet being replaced, and pressing operational demand due to operations 
in Afghanistan. 66 
Delays in achieving IOC, FOC and project close-out appear to be due to longer than expected 
timelines for establishing contracts for in-service support, maintainer training and upgrading 
infrastructure at CFB Trenton.67
62 Alan Williams, Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement, (Kingston: Breakout Education Network, 2006), 30.
63 
Conservative Party of Canada, “Conservatives Call for Boost to Canadian Forces,” Dec. 19, 2005.
64 RPP 2015/2016 
65 RPP 2016/2017
66 
Hillier, A Soldier First. 
67 DPR 2012/2013
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Major Milestones: Initial68 2014 2015 2016
Memorandum to Cabinet  June 2006 
Preliminary Project Approval June 2006 
Effective Project Approval  Fall 2007 Dec. 2007 
Contract Award  Fall 2007 Dec. 2007 
IOC  Summer 2011 Sept. 2013 
FOC  Summer 2013 Sept. 2016 Dec. 2016 Dec. 2016
Project Close-Out  Winter 2014 Dec. 2014 March 2017 March 2017
Progress in 2016:
No Information Publicly Available. 
68 DPR2006/2007
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Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship
Estimated Total Cost: $3.535 billion 
Project Description:
This project evolved from the 2006 Conservative Party of Canada election platform commitment 
to “station three new armed naval heavy icebreakers in the area of Iqaluit.”69 Over time this 
requirement was adapted significantly, and now calls for “an ice-capable ship”70 that will be able 
to operate year-round in one metre of first-year ice with old ice inclusions, while also being able to 
operate in the open ocean. The ship will be fitted with a gun system suited for constabulary roles, 
maintain a speed of 17 knots, operate at a range of 6,800 nautical miles, operate autonomously for 
up to four months, embark utility helicopters and provide limited support to the CH-148 Cyclone 
discussed below.
The project originally intended to acquire six to eight vessels, but this changed following a 
review of the design. The current contract for five to six ships required a project increase of 
roughly $300 million.
Explanation of Variance:
The Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship Project was delayed by the launch of the National Shipbuilding 
Procurement Strategy in June 2010. This process required first competitively selecting the winning 
shipyards that would build the ship (announced Oct. 19, 2011), and then negotiating umbrella 
agreements with the shipyards that lay out the terms for the overall program (completed in 
February 2012). Irving Shipyards Inc., awarded the work, subsequently undertook a roughly $300 
million shipyard upgrade which saw the construction of an entirely new shipbuilding facility.
The project has subsequently employed a design-then-build approach which has effectively front-
loaded a number of activities into a larger than usual definition contract. This effort resulted in a 
more costly and longer than normal definition stage designed to help gain a better understanding of 
the ship design prior to beginning construction in the implementation stage, as well as validating 
the new shipyard equipment and processes. The Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship Project is also being 
used to validate the systems and processes to be used for the entire combat work package, including 
the Canadian surface combatant discussed below.71 
69 Conservative Party of Canada, “Defending Sovereignty – Strengthening Canada’s Arctic Forces,” Dec. 22, 2005.
70 
National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Defence Acquisition Guide 2015, last modified June 25, 2014  
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-defence-acquisition-guide-2015/index.page 
71 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, “National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS)” last modified July 
14, 2015 http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/sam-mps/nouvelles-news-eng.html 
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Major Milestones: Initial72 2014 2015 2016
Memorandum to Cabinet  Jan. 2008 
Preliminary Project Approval May 2007 
Revised Project Approval Definition 1  Oct. 2011 
Revised Project Approval Definition 2  Dec. 2012 
Definition Contract  March 2013 
Effective Project Approval Jan. 2010 Dec. 2014 
Contract Award (Implementation) Jan. 2010 Jan. 2015 Dec. 2014 Jan. 2015
First Delivery  Aug. 2013 2018 2018 2018
IOC  March 2014 2019 2019 2019
FOC  Summer 201373  2023 2023 2023
Project Close-Out  Winter 201474 2024 2024 2024
Progress in 2016:
In March 2016 the first keel unit for ship 1, the HMCS Harry DeWolf, was moved into place. The 
second keel unit followed in May. In July the second of four main propulsion diesel engines and 
generators was installed.75 In July the request for proposals was released for the AOPS/JSS in-
service support contract (AJISS) which will support both vessel fleets.76 In December 2016, Thales 
Canada was reportedly told it had won the contract.77
72 DPR 07/08
73 DPR 2006/2007 
74 DPR 2006/2007 
75 http://shipsforcanada.ca/timeline#timeline 
76 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1102479 
77 
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/liberals-select-french-firm-for-5-2-billion-ship-maintenance-project-but-it-could-
cost-more-in-long-run 
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Canadian Cryptographic Modernization Program
Estimated Total Cost: $426 million 
Project Description:
The Canadian Cryptographic Modernization Program will modernize the government’s 
cryptographic equipment and infrastructure in order to safeguard classified information and 
maintain Canada’s ability to establish secure communications both nationally and internationally. 
The CCMP omnibus project includes the following sub-projects:
• Secure Voice / Telephone Re-key Infrastructure 
• Secure Voice / Telephone Family 
• Classified Security Management Infrastructure 
• Combat Identification Family (Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)) 
• Link Encryption Family 
• Network Encryption Family 
• Secure Radio Family 
• Combat Net Radio Enhancement 
• Secure Mobile Environment.
Explanations of Variances: 
The CCMP is reported to be on budget. Schedule slippage is in part due to its interdependence 
with the American cryptographic modernization initiative and the key management infrastructure 
program. Canada’s collaboration with the United States allows Canada to leverage American 
research and development and maintain interoperability with its allies, but as a result the Canadian 
project’s timeliness must align with the American initiative.78 On March 31, 2016, the end date of 
the program was extended to March 2021.79
78 RPP 2015/2016
79 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-departmental-performance/2016-status-report-on-transformational-and-
major-crown-projects.page#canadiancryptographicmodernizationprogram 
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Major Milestones: Initial80 2014 2015 2016
Preliminary Project Approval (omnibus) March 2005 
Preliminary Project Approval CSMI Nov. 2006 
Secure Voice / Telephone Re-key Infrastructure   Sept. 2009 
Secure Voice / Telephone Family  July 2012 
Classified Security Management Infrastructure – Phase 1A 2015  2017
Classified Security Management Infrastructure – Phase 1B March 2012 
Classified Security Management Infrastructure Phase 2 Def  March 2013 
Link Encryption Family   2020 2020 2020
Secure Mobile Environment (cancelled)  2014  N/A
Classified Security Management Infrastructure – Phase 2A 2017 2017 2018
Classified Security Management Infrastructure – Phase 2B 2019 2020 2021
Combat Net Radio Enhancement  2016 2016 2017
Network Encryption Family  2018 2018 2018
Combat Identification Family (IFF)  2018 2018 2018
Secure Radio Family  2019 2020 2020
Classified Security Management Infrastructure – Phase 3 2020 2020 2021
Progress in 2016:
No Information Publicly Available. 
80 RPP 2007/2008
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Canadian Search and Rescue Helicopter Project
Estimated Total Cost: $788 million
Project Description: 
This project emerged as one-half of the New Shipborne Aircraft Project that the Chrétien 
government cancelled in 1993, and subsequently split into two separate projects for search and 
rescue helicopters and maritime helicopters. It replaced the CH-113 Labradors with a fleet of 15 
new CH-149 Cormorant helicopters.81 
Explanation of Variances:
Initial delay was the result of the Chrétien decision to cancel the original New Shipborne Aircraft 
Project. Further delay then resulted from an initial, unchallenged assumption that the requirement 
could be procured off the shelf. In reality, an assessment found that the final aircraft delivered has 
less than 30 per cent commonality with the actual consistency – off the shelf variant. This delayed 
the issuance of airworthiness certification, and contributed to an initial under-resourcing of the 
Project Management Office.82 
Effective project closure was achieved on Sept. 15, 2004, but work is ongoing to achieve project 
close-out. A three-year technical publication revision service was required to progress towards 
FOC, which did not begin until 2007-2008.83 The work remaining is related to a minor retrofit 
after delivery, to conform to design specification, which is completed when major maintenance is 
conducted on the fleet and documentation in support of aircrew training is provided.
Major Milestones: Initial84 2014 2015 2016
Preliminary Project Approval Nov. 1995
Request for Proposal Nov. 1996
Effective Project Approval  April 1998 
Contract Award  April 1998 
First Delivery  June 2000 Sept. 2001 
Final Delivery July 200285 July 2003 
Project Completion (effective) July 200486 Sept. 2004 
Project Close-Out  Winter 201487 2015 2016 Fall 2017
Progress in 2016:
Five additional milestones were completed in FY 2015-2016 (but it is unclear which occurred 
during calendar year 2016). 
81 Aaron Plamondon, The Politics of Procurement, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010).
82 Chief Review Services, Review of the Canadian Search and Rescue Helicopter Acquisition (Cormorant) (Ottawa: 
Department of National Defence, 2007).
83 DPR 2006/2007
84 
RPP 1998/1999, 88-89.
85 RPP 1999/2000, 33.
86 RPP 1998/1999, 89.
87 DPR 2006/2007
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Canadian Surface Combatant Project
Estimated Total Cost: Originally $26.2 billion.88
Project Description:
The Canadian surface combatant project originally intended to recapitalize Canada’s naval fleet 
through two variants: An area air defence and task group command and control variant and a 
general purpose variant. This was first discussed in the 2005 Defence Policy Statement which 
pledged to “Begin to define the requirements for a new class of surface ship to replace the current 
destroyers and frigates.”89 The project formed part of the 2006 Conservative Party’s election 
platform, which committed to “initiating a longer-term frigate/destroyer replacement program,”90 
and was included in the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy. Whether the project will produce 
two variants or one, has not been discussed publicly. The project was originally set to acquire 15 
vessels, but this was later revised to “up to 15”91 vessels.92 The government is examining a batching 
strategy that could see the procurement broken into contracts for fewer than 15 ships at a time.93
Explanation of Variance:
The project is part of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, and progress on the Canadian 
surface combatant has been dependent upon progress on the other aspects of that wider strategy, 
detailed above. The project experienced significant delay in selecting the final procurement strategy, 
which was originally supposed to occur in the summer of 2013. The use of 15 industry engagement 
sessions since 2012 is reflective of a commitment to engaging with industry, but at the same time 
contributed to a delay in announcing a “most competitive procurement strategy” in May 2015. As a 
result, a gap of almost two years between the completion of the ASOP project and the start of CSC 
project construction had emerged. The revised procurement strategy that would see a military off-
the-shelf design procured is intended to reduce this gap as much as possible.
88 
Strong Secure Engaged pegged the new project cost for the acquisition of these ships at $56-60B.
89 Department of National Defence, Defence Policy Statement. (Ottawa: 2005), 14. All subsequent references to the Defence 
Policy Statement refer to this document. 
90 
Conservative Party of Canada, “Conservatives will Boost Defence on West Coast to Protect Canadian Sovereignty,” Dec. 
27, 2015.
91 Public Works and Government Services Canada, “National Shipbuilding Procurement Secretariat,” July 14, 2015  
http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/sam-mps/snacn-nsps-eng.html 
92 
Strong Secure Engaged put the future fleet number at 15.
93 
Evidence, House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence. 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, No. 28. Nov. 17, 2016.
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Major Milestones: Initial94 2014 2015 2016
Identification Phase Approval July 200795
Preliminary Project Approval 2011
Definition Phase 1  June 2012 
Definition Phase 2  Oct. 2014 2017 2017
Definition Contract  2016 2017 2017
Effective Project Approval  2019 Early 2020s Early 2020s
Implementation Contract Award 2015 2019 Early 2020s Early 2020s
First Delivery  2025 Late 2020s Late 2020s
IOC 2021 2026 Late 2020s Late 2020s
FOC 2036 2042 Mid-2040s Early 2040s
Project Close-Out 203796 2043 Late 2040s Early 2040s
Progress in 2016:
In February a proposed change in the procurement strategy was announced to selecting an 
existing warship design. This decision was confirmed in June. The shift followed a requirements 
reconciliation process the RCN undertook in the summer of 2015, which resulted in a modified set of 
requirements that can be met by adapted existing ship designs.97 Over the summer of 2016, Canadian 
industry and the pre-qualified short-listed respondents were also engaged on the draft request for 
proposals. On Oct. 27, the request for proposals was released to pre-qualified companies.98
94 RPP 2011/2012
95 DPR 2010/2011
96 RPP 13/14
97 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1083659 
98 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1143299 
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CP-140 Aurora Incremental Modernization / Structural Life Extension Projects (New)
Estimated Total Cost: $1,566 million (AIMP) + $421 million (ASLEP)
Project Description:
To deliver 14 modernized and life-extended CP-140 Aurora aircraft to the RCAF through four 
aircraft installation blocks.
Explanation of Variance:
To date, the Aurora Incremental Modernization Project has delivered a modernized navigation 
and communication capability to the RCAF and has updated the mission computer and sensors 
on nine of 14 aircraft, of which six have also had a structural life extension. The modernized 
Aurora aircraft have restored Canada’s airborne maritime surveillance capabilities while providing 
significant enhancements to its overland surveillance ability with its world-class integrated mission 
systems capabilities as demonstrated during domestic and international surveillance missions. 
The next block of the modernization was contracted with General Dynamics Mission Systems-
Canada in October 2015 to further enhance the Aurora’s capabilities and to maintain its operational 
relevance to its eventual retirement in the 2030 timeframe. By the end of 2016, 11 of 14 aircraft 
were to have been modernized; of which 10 will have also had a structural life extension.
Major Milestones: Initial99/2015 2016
Block 4 Definition Approved Oct. 2013 
Block 4 Implementation Approved June 2015 
Contract Award Oct. 2015 
Initial Operational Capability Dec. 2018 Dec. 2018
14th Modified Aircraft Delivered June 2020 June 2020
Contract Close-Out Dec. 2020 Dec. 2020
99 DPR 2014/2015
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Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft Replacement Project
Estimated Total Cost: 
Previously $1.45 billion. A contract was announced in December 2016 valued at up to $4.7 billion, 
including option years for maintenance and support through 2043.100
Project Description:
This project will replace the fixed-wing component of the RCAF’s search and rescue fleet. In 2004, 
the Martin government provided money in its budget to accelerate the replacement of search and 
rescue airplanes; it was mentioned specifically in the 2005 Defence Policy Statement, and was 
first brought forward for cabinet approval in the fall of 2005, but not approved.101 The project also 
appeared in the 2006 Conservative Party campaign platform, and was specifically mentioned in the 
2008 Canada First Defence Strategy.
Explanation of Variance:
An internal DND audit of the project noted initial delay following the 2004 budget related to a lack 
of external endorsement of the project’s procurement strategy, problems with the project’s life cycle 
costing, as well as an issue with its proposal for in-service support.102 Alan Williams described the 
former problem as related to the RCAF’s statement of operational requirement, which he contends 
the RCAF wrote to favour the Alenia C27J.103
The issue lingered for several years, until Public Works and Government Services Canada 
(PWGSC) asked the National Research Council to review the project’s requirements in 2009. 
It reported in March 2010 that “The [statement of operational requirement] as written is over-
constrained.”104 A revised document was finalized in December 2010, and a PWGSC-led secretariat 
was established to provide project governance in February 2012. Changes to the final request 
for proposals were also created by introducing a requirement for a Canadian in-service support 
integrator to maximize the industrial benefits accruing to Canadian industry from the project’s in-
service support arrangements.105 
100 
http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/air/arsvf-fwsar/index-eng.html 
101 Williams, Reinventing Defence Procurement.
102 Chief Review Services, “Audit of the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Project (FWSAR),”(Ottawa: Department of National 
Defence, May 2009).
103 Williams, 40.
104 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Review of the Statement of Operational Requirement for the Fixed 
Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft,” March 12, 2010 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs/fixed-wing-search-
rescue-aircraft-2010.page 
105 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft Replacement (FWSAR) Project: 
FWSAR Project - Independent Review of Evaluation Plans, Methods and Tools” April 2, 2015, Accessed Oct. 17, 2015. 
http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/stamgp-lamsmp/svtvnpro-rscfwpro-eng.html 
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Major Milestones: Initial 2014 2015 2016
DND Identification Approval Nov. 2002
Preliminary Project Approval Spring/Summer 2009106
Expenditure Authority – Def March 2012107 March 2012 
Project Approval – Def 2014108 2014 March 2015 
Effective Project Approval  Spring 2010109 2015 2016 
Contract Award  Spring/Summer 2010110 2015 2016 
First Delivery  March-Sept. 2005111 2018 2019 2019
IOC 2018112 2019 2020 2020
FOC 2019113 2021 2022 2022
Project Close-Out Spring/Summer 2017114 2022 2023 2023
Progress in 2016:
The government awarded a contract to Airbus Defence and Space on Dec. 1, 2016.
This contract includes delivery of 16 C295W aircraft; infrastructure and set-up activities, such as 
training and engineering services; construction of a new simulator-equipped training centre in 
Comox, B.C.; and maintenance and support services.
106 RPP 2009/2010
107 DPR 2014/2015
108 DPR 2014/2015
109 RPP 2009/2010
110 RPP 2009/2010
111 Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Plan 2004 (Ottawa: 2004), 194.
112 DPR 2011/2012
113 DPR 2011/2012
114 RPP 2009/2010
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Force Mobility Enhancement Project
Estimated Total Cost: $356 million
Project Description:
The Force Mobility Enhancement Project is a two-phase project. In Phase 1, the project will replace 
Canada’s aging Leopard 1 armoured engineer vehicle Badger fleet with a heavily protected and 
mobile platform capable of supporting the newly acquired Leopard 2 main battle tank until 2035. 
The project will then acquire 13 Leopard 2-based armoured engineer vehicles, with an option of 
an additional five, including engineering implements for the armoured engineer vehicle. In Phase 
2, the project will acquire tactical mobility implements for the in-service Leopard 2 main battle 
tank. Tactical mobility implements could include, but are not limited to, mine rollers, mine ploughs 
and dozer blades. The project will also seek to acquire two Leopard 2-based armoured recovery 
vehicles, with an option of an additional two, as support variants for the armoured engineer vehicle. 
The armoured recovery vehicles will be acquired by exercising contract options from the tank 
replacement project.
Explanations of Variances: 
On Dec. 10, 2013, the contractor informed DND that IOC would be postponed for seven months 
from February 2015 to September 2015 due to delays in the design and delivery of the casted chassis 
modules. On Aug. 26, 2014, DND was notified of a second delay to meeting IOC. This second delay 
is due to the postponement of ballistic testing by eight months.115
Canada has accepted the first three AEVs and all four of the ARVs have been delivered. Ten mine 
roller systems have been delivered, while dozer blades and mine ploughs are scheduled for delivery in 
2016. Modifications to the Leopard 2 MBT fleets are currently underway, with 18 vehicles completed.
The Senior Review Board (SRB) meeting on Feb. 5, 2016 endorsed revisions to the IOC date for 
Phase I to March 2017 and IOC date for Phase 2 to October 2016. The changes were due to the 
availability of the Canadian Army to conduct training.116
115 RPP 2015/2016
116 DPR 2015/2016
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Major Milestones: Initial117 2014 2015  2016
Preliminary Project Approval - Def. June 2009118 
RFP Phase 1 Oct. 2010 
RFP Phase 2 June 2011 
Effective Project Approval  April 2014119
Effective Project Approval Phase 1  March 2012 
Effective Project Approval Phase 2 Feb. 2012 Nov. 2013 
Contract Award Phase 1 Nov. 2011 Apr. 2012 
Contract Award Phase 2 March 2012 Nov. 2013 Dec. 2013 
IOC Phase 1 April 2014 Dec. 2015 Oct. 2016 March 2017
IOC Phase 2 Dec. 2013 Aug. 2015 Aug. 2015 Oct. 2016
FOC 2015120 Dec. 2016 Dec. 2017 Dec. 2017
Project Close-Out  2017121 2017 April 2018 March 2018
Progress in 2016:
No Information Publicly Available 
117 DPR 2010/2011
118 RPP 2010/2011
119 RPP 2010/2011
120 RPP 2010/2011
121 RPP 2010/2011
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Future Fighter Capability 
Estimated Total Cost: 
N/A.122 The prior Next Generation Fighter Capability Project to acquire the joint strike fighter had 
its acquisition envelope frozen at $8.990 billion.123 
Project Description:
The objective of the Future Fighter Capability Project is to replace the CF-18 fleet upon its 
retirement. Canada initially joined the concept demonstration phase of the joint strike fighter 
consortium in 1997, and subsequent phases of the project in 2002 and 2006. The 2008 Canada First 
Defence Strategy committed to purchasing “starting in 2017, 65 next-generation fighter aircraft to 
replace the existing fleet of CF-18s.”124 In June 2010 the government announced that Canada would 
purchase the joint strike fighter.125 
The Trudeau government has directed that as a matter of policy, Canada’s fighter fleets must be 
ready to meet Canada’s NATO and NORAD commitments simultaneously. The commander, 
RCAF, has stated that this policy “would mean that 65 aircraft aren’t sufficient as the final size of 
the fleet.”126
Explanation of Variance:
In March 2011, the Parliamentary Budget Officer released a report indicating that the cost of 
acquiring the aircraft exceeded those released publicly and in April 2012, a report from the auditor 
general similarly presented a higher cost estimate and also indicated several problems with the 
process used to decide to purchase the F-35. On April 3, 2012, the government announced a 
comprehensive response to the auditor general’s report, including a seven-point plan to address 
the auditor general’s recommendation. As a result, the National Fighter Procurement Secretariat 
was established to provide oversight and co-ordination among the departments involved with the 
implementation of the seven-point plan, and the procurement was reset. All of the work associated 
with the seven-point plan was completed in December 2014. 
During the 2015 federal election, the Liberal Party stated that “we will not buy the F-35,” and 
instead “immediately launch an open and transparent competition to replace the CF-18 fighter 
aircraft.”127 Sajjan’s mandate letter instructed him to “launch an open and transparent competition 
to replace the CF-18 fighter aircraft, focusing on options that match Canada’s defence need.”
122 
Strong Secure Engaged pegged the project budget for future fighters at $15-18B
123 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/sites/FORCES_Internet/about-reports-pubs/next-gen-fighter-independent-review-2014.page 
124 Department of National Defence. Canada First Defence Strategy, 17.
125 
Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2012 Spring Report of the Auditor General of Canada: Chapter 2—Replacing 
Canada’s Fighter Jets (Ottawa: Spring 2012).
126 Evidence, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence Nov. 28, 2016 http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/
Committee/421/secd/09ev-52940-e.htm 
127 Liberal Party of Canada, A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class (Ottawa: 2015), 70.
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Major Milestones: Initial128 2014129 2015 2016
Identification Phase Approval Jan. 2010 
First Procurement Request Jan. 2012
First Delivery Dec. 2016
IOC May 2020
FOC Sept. 2025
Project Close-Out  Dec. 2027
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In April 2012, a complete review of the project was announced.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Nov. 22, 2016, a revised approach was announced.
Progress in 2016:
In July, the government of Canada launched a round of industry engagement with interested 
suppliers of fighter aircraft.130 On Nov. 22, the government announced a revised approach to 
acquiring fighter aircraft. It will first discuss with the U.S. government and Boeing a potential 
procurement of 18 Super Hornet aircraft for use over an interim period to determine if they can be 
provided “at a cost, time, level of capability, and economic value that are acceptable to Canada.”131 
At the same time, the Liberals also announced that they “will, within the current mandate, launch 
an open competitive procurement process to permanently replace the CF-18 fighter aircraft.”132 
This effort will be informed by the results of the Defence Policy Review, and the government “will 
develop its purchasing requirements for the aircraft, everything from the number of aircraft needed 
to defend Canadians and in-service support requirements, to economic benefits to Canada, to the 
estimated time of delivery.”133
128 DPR 2010/2011
129 DPR 2013/2014
130 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-equipment/next-gen-fighter.page 
131 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?mthd=tp&crtr.page=1&nid=1158689&crtr.tp1D=930 
132 Ibid.
133 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?mthd=tp&crtr.page=1&nid=1158689&crtr.tp1D=930 
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Halifax-Class Modernization/Frigate Life Extension
Estimated Total Cost: 
$2.758 billion (Other cost breakdowns cite a total of $4.3 billion134)
Project Description:
This project is both modernizing and life-extending all 12 Halifax-class frigates, commissioned 
between 1992 and 1996. It began as a life extension only (FELEX in the proceeding page), but 
this was combined in 2005 to include a number of capability upgrades (HCM/FELEX). This was 
pledged in the 2005 Defence Policy Statement135 and mentioned in the 2006 Conservative Party 
platform.136 The ships were originally designed for anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare 
in the open ocean environment, while the fleet’s operational activities have shifted increasingly 
to littoral regions. The project is providing enhancements to both sensors and weapons as well as 
life-extending critical equipment. This includes a new combat management system; radar suite; 
interrogator friend or foe mode S/5; internal communications system upgrade; Harpoon missile 
system upgrade; electronic warfare system upgrade; long-range infrared search and track system; 
modification to the gun; and replacement of the Shield II missile decoy countermeasures system, 
integrated machinery control system and navigation radars.137 A limited capability to embark a task 
group commander has been added to four of the ships as well.138
Explanation of Variance
The project is extremely complex, involving major changes to the ships’ systems, with work 
occurring in two separate shipyards, with a separate contract for the combat systems integration, 
internal communications system and weapons control system. The project was led by an innovative 
management arrangement which created a committee of sponsors including the assistant deputy 
minister materiel, the commander, RCN, the assistant deputy minister acquisitions from Public 
Works and Government Services Canada, as well as the chief executive officers from each of 
the principal contractors to establish collaborative working relations from the beginning of the 
project.139 This arrangement was crucial to resolving schedule issues and controlling costs, and was 
facilitated by continuity in key staff positions. 140 
134 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?mthd=index&crtr.page=1&nid=1059339 
135 Department of National Defence, Defence Policy Statement, 14.
136 
Conservative Party of Canada, “Conservatives will Boost Defence on West Coast to Protect Canadian Sovereignty,” Dec. 
27, 2015.
137 
National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Halifax-Class Modernization (HCM) / Frigate Life Extension 
(FELEX),” Nov. 24, 2014 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=halifax-class-modernization-hcm-frigate-life-
extension-felex/hkm9beb0 
138 RPP 2015/2016
139 Chief Review Services. Audit of the Halifax-Class Modernization / Frigate Life Extension (HCM/FELEX) Project. (Ottawa: 
Department of National Defence , 2011).
140 Doug Dempster, “Navigating Complexity,” Vanguard, September/October 2015.
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Major Milestones: Initial141 2014 2015 2016
Preliminary Project Approval (FELEX) Feb. 2005 
Preliminary Project Approval (HCM) Feb. 2007 
Effective Project Approval  April 2008 Sept. 2008 
Multi-Ship Contract Awards Oct. 2007 March 2008 
Combat System Integration Contract Sept. 2008 Nov. 2008 
Refits Start  April 2010 Oct. 2010 
IOC Jan. 2015142 Jan. 2015 
FOC Jan. 2018143 Jan. 2018 Jan. 2018 Jan. 2018
Project Close-Out  April 2018 Jan. 2019 Jan. 2019 Jan. 2019
Progress in 2016:
The last frigate to go through the process, HMCS Toronto, completed its upgrade on schedule, in 
November 2016.
141 DPR 2006/2007
142 RPP 2014/2015
143 RPP 2009/2010
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Land Forces Intelligence Surveillance, Target Acquisition and  
Reconnaissance System
Estimated Total Cost: $672 million144
Project Description: 
This project is providing an integrated, interoperable, intelligence surveillance, target acquisition 
and reconnaissance capability that will improve commanders’ ability to visualize the operational 
area, manage sensors and information collection resources, and to plan and implement actions 
to successfully complete operational missions. It will enhance existing capabilities and acquire 
new ones in the areas of communications, command and control and sensors. The project 
includes the acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), weapon-locating sensors (WLS) and 
transformation or enhancement of existing sensor platforms to include electronic warfare (EW). 
In support of Operation Athena in the 2003/2004 timeframe, the project delivered equipment 
in the areas of command and control, tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV), weapons-
locating sensors and electronic warfare capabilities as “unforecasted operational requirements.” 
Early deliveries of elements of the unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare and data link 
communications sub-projects continued during 2006 for Operation Archer. As well, urgently 
required systems, in particular the acoustic weapons locating system, the lightweight counter 
mortar radar system, and additional electronic warfare systems were fielded in 2007. 
Explanations of Variances: 
Initial deliveries were estimated to occur in 2005-2006, but the unforecasted operational 
requirement for a UAV and other sensor upgrades resulted in the delivery of a partial tactical UAV 
and electronic warfare capability in Afghanistan in 2003-2004. The implementation of the other sub-
projects was delayed as the project team delivered numerous other aspects of the projects that were 
also unforecasted operational requirements to Afghanistan.145 Current estimates are that the project 
will be completed in 2018. This delay is associated with the U.S. government’s contracting delays 
for equipment acquired through foreign military sales and by other delays incurred in deliveries.146 
The project benefited from the ability to make maximum use of its project management resources 
and reallocate project staff towards urgent requirements quickly as well as project management 
continuity. 147 The medium-range radar contract was awarded in summer 2015 for initial delivery 
in June 2017 (first radar), the man-portable surveillance and target acquisition radar (MSTAR) and 
remote viewing terminal will start delivery in early FY 2016-2017, and the ISTAR C2 will continue 
to deliver the final items of the advance patrol collection kit until the end of 2017.148 
144 This estimate is for the LF ISTAR Omnibus project.
145 RPP 2014/2015
146 RPP 2015/2016
147 Dempster, “Navigating Complexity,” Vanguard.
148 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-departmental-performance/2016-status-report-on-transformational-and-
major-crown-projects.page#futurefightercapability 
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Major Milestones: Initial149 2014 2015 2016
Preliminary Project Approval April 3, 2003 
TUAV Unforecasted Operational Requirement (UOR)
Minister of National Defence Approval  May 2003 
FOC  Dec. 2005 
Emergency Beyond Line-of-Sight Communication
Effective Project Approval  Nov. 2005 
FOC  March 2010 
Communications & Data Link Component
Effective Project Approval  Dec. 2006 
FOC   Dec. 2014 March 2015 June 2015
Command and Control (C2)
Effective Project Approval  Feb. 2008 
FOC  Nov. 2015 Nov. 2015 Nov. 2017
Electronic Warfare Warning (EW) Sensors
Effective Project Approval  Nov. 2005 
FOC  June 2015 June 2015 
In-Service Sensors Enhancement 
Effective Project Approval  Jan. 2012 
FOC  March 2016 March 2016 March 2018
Weapon-Locating Sensors (WLS) Acoustic Sensor
Effective Project Approval  Nov. 2005 
FOC  April 2010 
Family of UAV 
Effective Project Approval – UOR  Nov. 2005 
FOC  March 2016 March 2016 March 2018
Light Weight Counter Mortar Radar 
Effective Project Approval  March 2007 
FOC  Dec. 2015 Dec. 2015 July 2016
149 DPR2006/2007
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Medium-Range Radar
Effective Project Approval  Jan. 2012 
IOC  June 2017 June 2017 July 2017
FOC  Dec. 2017 Dec. 2017 June 2018
Deliveries on All Sub-projects 2012  May 2018 May 2018 May 2018
Project Close-Out  March 2013 March 2018 Sept. 2018  Sept. 2018
Progress in 2016:
In August 2016 the government announced that it would be purchasing a small unmanned aerial 
vehicle from the United States Navy through a foreign military sale. The sale includes five 
unmanned aircraft, two ground control stations and one launch and recovery system for $14.2 
million, to be delivered in 2017.150
150 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1117239 
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Joint Support Ship
Estimated Total Cost: $2.329 billion
Project Description:
This project is replacing the RCN’s auxiliary oiler replenishment vessels. It was first discussed 
in the 1994 white paper,151 and the Liberal Party committed to purchase the vessels in its 2004 
campaign, as did the Conservative Party in 2006.152 Early iterations of the project envisioned a 
vessel that would replace the existing capability and provide significant additional joint capabilities 
in the form of command and control, sealift and medical facilities. In August 2008, the project was 
cancelled when both submitted bids were “significantly over the established budget provisions.”153 
The failure of this project and one for the Canadian Coast Guard spurred the establishment of the 
National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, launched June 3, 2010.154 The ships will be based on 
an adaptation of the German navy’s Berlin-class.
Progress Report and Explanations of Variances:
The initial delay in acquiring this project was attributable to a shortage of capital funds in the 
1990s. Subsequently, the first iteration of the project failed due to a significant deterioration of the 
government’s knowledge of the Canadian shipbuilding industry, and the industry’s condition by 
the mid-2000s. As with the other projects of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, this 
one was delayed as the overall strategy was implemented. The Joint Support Ship Project will be 
the third class of ship built at the Seaspan Vancouver shipyards, following three offshore fisheries 
science vessels and then an offshore oceanographic science vessel for the Canadian Coast Guard. 
An agreement in principle for the construction of the first class was only reached and first steel cut 
in June 2015. Their production was originally to take until 2017, to be followed by the second class, 
and only then will work start on the joint support ship. While work is progressing on the vessels’ 
initial design review, the project is impacted both by delays associated with the earlier projects 
that precede it, and the resource-intensive efforts to make progress on those same projects by both 
the shipyard and Canada.155 On June 23, 2015 the government announced that it was pursuing an 
interim auxiliary oiler replenishment capability to be used until the joint support ship is delivered. 
In November the assistant deputy minister of materiel stated that a build contract was 12 to 14 
months away and the first steel would be cut on the project in 2019.156 
151 Department of National Defence, 1994 White Paper. (Ottawa: 1994). http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/downloads/1994%20
White%20Paper%20on%20Defence.pdf
152 
Conservative Party of Canada, “Conservatives will Boost Defence on West Coast to Protect Canadian Sovereignty,” Dec. 
27, 2015.
153 
Government of Canada, “Archived - Bidders fail to meet budget requirements,” Aug. 22, 2008 http://news.gc.ca/web/article-
eng.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=tp&crtr.mnthndVl=&nid=416189
154 Public Works and Government Services Canada, “National Shipbuilding Procurement Secretariat.”
155 
Royal Canadian Navy, Joint Support Ship, last modified June 10, 2015 http://www.navy-marine.forces.gc.ca/en/fleet-units/
jss-home.page 
156 
Evidence, House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence. 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, No. 28. Nov. 17, 2016. 
His chief of staff cited 2018 as the start date for construction in separate testimony, however. http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/
sen/committee/421/NFFN/52946-E.HTM 
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Major Milestones: Initial157 2014 2015 2016
Memorandum to Cabinet April 2004
Preliminary Project Approval Nov. 2004
Project Definition Contract Dec. 2006
Effective Project Approval  2008
First Delivery  2012
IOC 2013
FOC 2016
---------------------------------Project was cancelled and re-launched---------------------------------
Revised Preliminary Project Approval June 2010158 
Effective Project Approval Feb. 2013159 2016 Fall 2017 Fall 2017
Implementation Contract March 2013160 2016 Fall 2017 Fall 2017
IOC Spring 2018161 2019 2020 2021
FOC Fall 2019162 2020 2021 2022
Project Close-Out  2020 2022 2022
Progress in 2016
In March 2016 a contract was announced for long lead items for JSS. This $35.4 million (including 
taxes) contract will enable Vancouver Shipyards Co. Ltd. to engage suppliers and select the 
equipment needed to finalize the design and to build the JSS. The contract value will increase as 
the design progresses and additional commitments are made regarding equipment purchases. The 
first group of long lead items includes propulsion systems, generators, switchboards, and other 
specialized parts and equipment.163 
157 DPR 2006/2007
158 DPR 2009/2010
159 RPP 2011/2012
160 RPP 2011/2012
161 RPP 2011/2012
162 RPP 2011/2012
163 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1039769#bckgrnd 
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Joint Unmanned Surveillance and Target Acquisition System
Estimated Total Cost: N/A
Project Description:
The project was initially slated to procure and field a mature medium-altitude long-endurance 
unmanned aerial vehicle system to provide capabilities for domestic and international operations. 
It was intended to complement existing reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 
capabilities, increase maritime and Arctic domain awareness and provide a “precision force 
application” capability in support of Land and Special Operations Forces.164 The project was 
mentioned in the 2006 Conservative Party of Canada platform, which committed to “providing 
eastern and western Arctic air surveillance through stationing new long-range uninhabited aerial 
vehicle (UAV) squadrons.”165 In 2016, the project description called for a “long-range, long-
endurance”166 capability and the chief of the defence staff stated that the project had been assigned 
increased importance, and that he would like to see the acquisition of an armed platform.167
Explanation of Variance:
The project has been in the options analysis stage since 2005. As a result of the limited market for 
unmanned aircraft that would satisfy all mandatory operational requirements in 2007, the project 
was delayed to enable a competitive procurement strategy, as a sole-source procurement was deemed 
unacceptable at the time by the contracting authority, resulting in a more than three-year delay. In the 
meantime, the project office delivered a leased solution for operations in Afghanistan between 2009 
and 2011, which delayed progress on the acquisition further. The project was again slowed down by 
changing capability requirements for speed, range, endurance and intelligence functions.168
164 RPP 2011/2012
165 
Conservative Party of Canada, “Stephen Harper Stands Up for Canada’s Sovereignty in the Arctic,” Dec. 22, 2015.
166 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-defence-acquisition-guide-2016/aerospace-systems-59.page 
167 
Evidence, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. The new policy specifies that this poject will 
acquire and armed platform.
168 Chief Review Services, Internal Audit of Joint Unmanned Surveillance and Target Acquisition System (JUSTAS) Project 
(Ottawa: Department of National Defence, March 2014)
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Major Milestones: Initial169 2014 2015 2016
Preliminary Project Approval TBD 2016-2018 2017 TBD 
Effective Project Approval  TBD 2019-2020 2020 TBD
Contract Award  TBD 2019-2020 2020 TBD
First Delivery  TBD TBD TBD TBD
IOC TBD TBD TBD TBD
FOC TBD TBD TBD TBD
Project Close-Out  TBD TBD TBD TBD
Progress in 2016:
In January 2016 a request for information on the project was released and responses were provided 
to the government April 15.170
169 2011/2012
170 
https://buyandsell.gc.ca/procurement-data/tender-notice/PW-BL-298-25611 
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Light Armoured Vehicle III Upgrade Project
Estimated Total Cost: $1.320 billion
Project Description: 
This project was part of the family of Land Combat Vehicles projects announced in the 2008 
Canada First Defence Strategy. The CAF’s experience in Afghanistan demonstrated the ongoing 
requirement for a highly protected, yet highly mobile light armoured vehicle. The threats of 
mines, improvised explosive devices, explosively formed projectiles and anti-armour weapons 
were deemed likely to be present in most medium- to high-threat missions. Despite improvements 
to the protection of the light armoured vehicle (LAV) III fleet deployed to Afghanistan, it had 
insufficient armour to defeat modern threats, and insufficient mobility given the increased weight 
of the vehicle due to the protection kits and the increased stowage of combat supplies. Further, 
the target acquisition and fire control systems require upgrading to overcome obsolescence issues 
and to improve lethality. Contract award was announced in October 2011, and in November 2012 
a contract amendment was announced exercising an option to upgrade 66 additional vehicles for a 
reconnaissance and surveillance capability.171
Explanation of Variance: 
First deliveries of the vehicles occurred in December 2012 and initial operational capability 
occurred in June 2014.172
Major Milestones: Initial173 2014 2015 2016
Preliminary Project Approval June 2009 
Contract Approval Early 2010 
Implementation Start Spring 2011 Oct. 2011 
First Delivery  Late 2011174 Dec. 2012 
IOC Fall 2013175 Spring 2014 
FOC 2018 2018 Spring 2019 2019
Project Completed  Spring 2019 March 2019 June 2019 2019
Progress in 2016
In 2016 the number of vehicles inducted into production rose from 185 to 420, the number produced 
increased from 143 to 332 and the number fielded to operational units has risen from 64 to 262.176
171 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) III Upgrade Project,” Feb. 8, 2013 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=light-armoured-vehicle-lav-iii-upgrade-project/hie8w7nv 
172 RPP 2016/2017
173 RPP 2010/2011
174 RPP 2010/2011
175 RPP 2013/2014
176 DPR 2015/2016
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Lightweight Towed Howitzer
Estimated Total Cost: $265 million
Project Description:
The lightweight towed howitzer will bridge a key facet of the army’s current indirect fire capability 
deficiency. It will field 25 M777 lightweight 155mm towed howitzers, each with a digital gun 
management system (DGMS), supported by improved ammunition and a modern truck. These 
howitzers will augment the 12 M777 howitzers currently in service. These capability enhancements 
in terms of lethality, range, precision, mobility and digitization are needed to support future 
missions and tasks likely to be assigned to the Canadian Army. 
Explanation of Variance:
Deliveries of the M777 howitzers and the digital gun management system components started in 2010 
and were completed in the summer of 2011. IOC was originally forecasted to occur in July 2011 and 
was shifted to October 2011 as a result of unforeseen issues with technical integration. In October 
2012 the project achieved full IOC. The M777 infrastructure initiative is currently in the construction 
phase. The majority of infrastructure initiatives are expected to be completed by 2015-2016.
The project is planning to achieve effective project closure in March 2018, a delay from the original 
date of June 2016. This is due to the requirement to deliver infrastructure, the medium-support 
vehicle system gun tractor variant, ammunition components and the ammunition storage and handling 
system before doing so. The project had significant interdependencies with the medium-support 
vehicle system project, which has been much delayed. In 2014/2015, the project was also informed that 
delivery of the improved ammunitions was delayed to address improvements after completion of the 
evaluation trial, delaying systems integration work until the ammunition is delivered.177 
Major Milestones: Initial178 2014 2015 2016
Preliminary Project Approval Jan. 2008 
FMS Sales Agreement Nov. 2008 
DGMS Contract Award April 2009 Nov. 2009 
Effective Project Approval  June 2009 Jan. 2010 
IOC April 2011 Oct. 2011 Oct. 2012 
FOC Dec. 2012 March 2016 Dec. 2017  Dec. 2017
Project Close-Out  June 2013 June 2016 March 2018 March 2018
Progress in 2016:
No Information Publicly Available. 
177 RPP 2015/2016
178 RPP 2009/2010
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Maritime Helicopter Project
Estimated Total Cost: $3.174 billion
Project Description: 
This project was originally begun in 1986 under the New Shipborne Aircraft Project to acquire a 
fleet of maritime helicopters. The latest iteration, the Maritime Helicopter Project, is scheduled to 
replace the fleet of CH-124 Sea Kings with 28 new fully equipped Sikorsky Cyclone helicopters. 
The acquisition contract is bundled with a long-term in-service support contract and modifies the 
modernized frigates discussed earlier to accommodate them.179 
Explanation of Variance:
This project has been much delayed, beginning when the New Shipborne Aircraft Project was 
cancelled in 1993. When the project was re-launched, it was initially intended to award contracts 
separately for the basic vehicle and integrated mission system. The change in procurement strategy 
to letting a single contract for the helicopter and its in-service support led to some early delays and 
was later abandoned.180 Since the Maritime Helicopter Project contract was signed in 2004, the 
project has experienced multiple further delays, largely related to problems achieving the desired 
level of capability. In 2008, after a request from the prime contractor, the contract was amended to 
allow for a delayed, tiered delivery schedule. This schedule was amended a second time in 2010. 
This was followed by a third-party review and analysis of possible alternatives in 2013 to assess 
the project’s feasibility.181 While this was approved as an off-the-shelf project, in reality it was not, 
as the helicopter that will ultimately be produced never existed before. This resulted in difficulties 
achieving the capabilities set out in the original contract, and required time-consuming systems 
integration. Further, the incorrect assessment of the project’s developmental nature resulted in an 
inappropriate management framework and project schedule.182
In June 2014, another contract amendment was signed extending the in-service support 
arrangements to 2038 at the original rates, and revising the project schedule, allowing for eight 
initial capability Block 1 aircraft to be delivered starting in June 2015. To date, 27 helicopters have 
completed initial build, and four of these have completed the Block 1 upgrade program. The initial 
build of the 28th helicopter is underway. The project is running within its authorized budget.183
179 Plamandon, The Politics of Procurement.
180 
RPP 2001-2002
181 
National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Archived - Maritime Helicopter Project: Status (Fact Sheet),” June 19, 
2014 http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?mthd=index&crtr.page=1&nid=859129 
182 
Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 6: Acquisition of Military Helicopters. (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works 
and Government Services Canada, 2010).
183 
National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Archived - Maritime Helicopter Project: Status (Fact Sheet).”
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Major Milestones: Initial 2014 2015 2016
Preliminary Project Approval June 2003 
Invitation for Bids Posted Dec. 2003 
Effective Project Approval  Nov. 2004 
Contract Award  Nov. 2004 
First Delivery  Jan. 2009 
---------The Project Scheduled Was Revised Following a Contract Amendment in 2014---------
Amended Project Approval  June 2014 
First Delivery (Block 1)  2015 
First Delivery (Block 2)  2018 2018 2018
Project Close-Out  2013 2021 2022 2022
Progress in 2016:
As of December 2016, Canada had accepted 10 helicopters. Initial cadre training started in May 
2016. The contract was amended Jan. 28, 2016 and again Aug. 23, 2016. Testing for ship’s helicopter 
and operating limits was conducted in the first four months of 2016 on HMCS Halifax. Block 2 
critical design review was successfully completed in April 2016.184
184 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-equipment/maritime-helicoper.page 
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Medium-Support Vehicle System Project
Estimated Total Cost: $1.513 billion
Project Description:
On June 29, 2006 the government announced that it would acquire medium-sized logistics trucks 
as part of its Canada First Defence Strategy procurements. At the time of the announcement, 
this was articulated as the purchase of 1,500 vehicles designed for military use; up to 300 load-
handling system companion trailers; 800 commercial vehicles adapted for military use; 1,000 
specially equipped vehicle kits, such as mobile kitchens, offices and medical or dental stations; and 
300 armour protection systems.185 The Medium-Support Vehicle System Project was subsequently 
divided into five phases to reflect the aforementioned components, plus an additional fifth phase 
to provide for infrastructure. These are: Phase 1 – militarized commercial-off-the-shelf (Milcots); 
Phase 2 – special equipment vehicle baseline shelters (shelters); Phase 3 – modification of the SEV 
shelters (kitting); and Phase 4 – standard military pattern (SMP) trucks. Contracts were awarded 
for the shelters and Milcots phases in 2009 and for the kitting in 2012.186 A contract for the SMP 
was awarded to Mack Defence LLC in June 2015. First delivery is expected in fall 2017.187
Explanation of Variance:
While most components of this acquisition progressed without problems, the standard military 
pattern vehicle experienced greater difficulty. An RFP was released in 2011, but was ultimately 
cancelled just before the deadline in 2012.188 Since it was originally launched, project requirements 
had evolved in lieu of the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy and market factors had changed, 
as they had for a parallel logistics vehicle modernization project which will also procure trucks 
for the army. Following a 2009 price and availability request to industry, it was determined that 
additional funds were needed for the project, which were reallocated from the Logistics Vehicle 
Modernization Project. While the total project budgets for each project combined remained 
unchanged, this financial reallocation was deemed not to have been properly communicated 
in official documentation. This was in part because of the introduction of the new reporting 
requirements related to the adoption of the Treasury Board’s investment planning policy, described 
earlier. This led to the request for proposal’s cancellation, resulting in an 18-month project delay.189 
185 
Canada, National Defence, “Backgrounder: ‘Canada First’ Defence Strategy Procurement, BG–06.014,” June 29, 2006.
186 RPP 2015/2016
187 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-equipment/medium-support-vehicle.page 
188 The Canadian Press, “Military Truck Purchase Cancelled Due to Cost Concerns,” July 11, 2012 http://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/military-truck-purchase-cancelled-due-to-cost-concerns-1.1273570 
189 Canada, Department of National Defence, Chief Review Services. Internal Audit of the Medium Support Vehicle System 
Project. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2014).
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Major Milestones: Initial190 2014 2015 2016
Preliminary Project Approval June 2006 
Effective Project Approval  June 2008 
First Delivery (Milcots) March 2009 June 2009 
Final Delivery (Milcots) Sept. 2010 Oct. 2012 March 2011 
Contract Award (Shelters) June 2008 July 2009 
First Delivery (Shelters) July 2008 April 2012 May 2012 
Final Delivery (Shelters) June 2010 Fall 2014 Feb. 2015 
Contract Award (Kitting) Dec. 2012 
First Delivery (Kitting)  Jan. 2014 
Final Delivery (Kitting) TBD  Fall 2016 
Contract Award (SMP) Nov. 2008 June 2015 
First Delivery (SMP) Aug. 2009 2017 Spring 2017 Fall 2017
Final Delivery (SMP) Aug. 2011 2018 Fall 2018 Spring 2019
IOC 2013
FOC 2016
Project Close-Out March 2010 2020 Dec. 2020 Dec. 2020
Progress in 2016: 
In November 2016, the government received final delivery of the last kitted shelters on time and on 
budget.191
190 DPR 2006/2007
191 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-equipment/medium-support-vehicle.page 
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Medium-to-Heavy Lift Helicopter
Estimated Total Cost: $2.313 billion
Project Description:
The project has delivered 15 Chinook CH-147Fs and is establishing a new transport helicopter 
capability to support land-based domestic and international operations. The project includes the 
associated infrastructure and support elements to create a new helicopter unit based at Garrison 
Petawawa. It was included in the 2005 budget, and the 2005 Defence Policy Statement. It was first 
brought forward for cabinet approval in the fall of 2005, but not approved. It was therefore delayed 
awaiting approval by the new Harper cabinet after the 2006 election.192 As originally conceived, the 
project was to deliver its first helicopter in 2008, but this did not occur until 2013.193
Explanation of Variance: 
The delays in acquiring the helicopter resulted from the evolution of the requirements after 2006, 
which were not finalized until a contract was signed in 2009. While an existing model of the 
aircraft could have met the original requirements developed for the project, the specifications 
actually provided to the contractor could not. They required significant changes to a basic 
helicopter model, requiring an additional two years to define the statement of work, and adding 
costs. This also impacted the timing and complexity of achieving certification for airworthiness.194
All 15 aircraft have been delivered, the last being accepted in June 2014. A reduction in the size of 
the project office, commensurate with the work remaining, commenced in 2014 and will continue 
until project closure.195 
Major Milestones: Initial 2014 2015 2016
Preliminary Project Approval June 2006 
Advanced Contract Award Notice July 2006 
Effective Project Approval  March 2008 June 2009 
Contract Award  March 2008 June 2009 
First Delivery  March 2011 June 2013 
IOC March 2013 Fall 2014 Feb. 2015 
FOC Spring 2015 June 2017 June 2017 June 2017
Project Close-Out  Fall 2015 June 2018 June 2018 June 2018
Progress in 2016:
The first Chinook pilot, flight engineer and load master graduated from the Garrison Petawawa 
Operational Training Centre Feb. 12, 2016. The aircraft deployed on their first domestic humanitarian 
deployment on Operation LENTUS in response to the massive Fort McMurray wildfires.
192 
Hillier, A Soldier First.
193 
Office of the Auditor General of Canada. Chapter 6: Acquisition of Military Helicopters. (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works 
and Government Services Canada, 2010).
194 Ibid.
195 RPP 2015/2016
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Mercury Global
Estimated Total Cost: $439 million
Project Description: 
The project will provide wideband global satellite communications that are guaranteed and directly 
interoperable with our principal allies. The project will deliver a Canadian wideband global system 
military satellite communications system for near-worldwide assured, wideband communications to 
the Canadian military for the command and control of deployed Canadian commanders and forces, 
as well as interoperability with some of our principal allies, the United States, Australia, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg and New Zealand.
Progress Report and Explanations of Variances: 
In Phase 1, procurement of early access terminals and participation in the U.S. Department of 
Defense Wideband Global Satellite constellation was obtained through a 2012 memorandum 
of understanding for the construction and launch of the ninth wideband global system satellite. 
Effective approval for Phase 2 was achieved in 2014 for the procurement and installation of the 
associated wideband global satellite anchor station. General Dynamics Mission Systems-Canada 
was awarded contracts for both the installation of the anchor stations and in-service support of the 
system for seven years, with options for support up to an additional 10 years. Construction of the 
central anchor station commenced on Oct. 13, 2015. 
Major Milestones: Initial196 2014 2015 2016
Preliminary Project Approval  Oct. 2011 
Initial Satellite Access Nov. 2011 June 2012 
Effective Project Approval  Jan. 2014 Oct. 2014 
Terminal Implementation Complete Oct. 2016 Oct. 2016 Oct. 2016 June 2018
IOC   May 2013 
FOC Oct. 2017 Oct. 2016 Oct. 2016 Sept. 2018
Project Complete Winter 2018 Jan. 2017 Jan. 2017 Dec. 2018
Progress in 2016:
With the initial operating capability, the project has supported Operations Impact, Unifier, Caribbe, 
Nanook, Reassurance and Renaissance.197 In July 2016, a request for information was released for 
strategic deployable terminals,198 followed by a notice of proposed procurement in October.199 
196 DPR 2011/2012
197 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-departmental-performance/2016-status-report-on-transformational-and-
major-crown-projects.page#lightarmouredvehicleiii 
198 
https://buyandsell.gc.ca/procurement-data/tender-notice/PW-ST-006-30354 
199 
https://buyandsell.gc.ca/procurement-data/tender-notice/PW-ST-006-30555 
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Protected Military Satellite Communications
Estimated Total Cost: $555 million 
Project Description: 
The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces require global communications 
that are secure, guaranteed and directly interoperable with our allies. The project’s aim is to 
overcome current Canadian interoperability and global command and control limitations. Upon 
completion, this project will enable long-range communications to deployed forces and facilitate 
their interoperability with allies.
Explanations of Variances: 
In Phase 1, procurement of guaranteed access to the U.S. Department of Defense advanced 
extremely high frequency satellite constellation was obtained through a military satellite 
communications memorandum of understanding. Phase 2 has been underway since November 
2003, when effective project approval for the procurement and installation of the satellite terminals 
was granted. The Canadian project is late due to delays to the American satellite launch schedule 
and the Victoria-class submarine installation.
Major Milestones: Initial200 2014 2015 2016
Preliminary Project Approval Aug. 1999 
Effective Project Approval  Nov. 2003 
Initial Terminal Delivery  Summer 2005 Nov. 2011 
IOC Nov. 2013201 N/A 
FOC Fall 2017202 Dec. 2020 Dec. 2020 Dec. 2020
Project Complete  Summer 2009 March 2021 March 2021 March 2021
Progress in 2016:
No Information Publicly Available. 
200 RPP 2000/2001, 58.
201 RPP 2014/2015
202 RPP 2011/2012
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Submarine Capability Life Extension
Estimated Total Cost: $877 million
Project Description:
The Submarine Capability Life Extension Project replaced the Oberon-class submarine fleet with 
four existing British Upholder-class (renamed Canadian Victoria-class) submarines. The project will 
ensure that Canada preserves its submarine capability within the existing capital budget. The project 
supports Canada’s ability to conduct surveillance and control of its territory, airspace and maritime 
areas of jurisdiction, as well as Canada’s ability to participate in bilateral and multilateral operations. 
The project delivered four functional Victoria-class submarines with up-to-date, safe-to-dive 
certificates, four crew trainers (including a combat systems trainer, a ship control trainer, a 
machinery control trainer, and a torpedo handling and discharge trainer), and four trained crews.
Explanation of Variance: 
Although effective project close-out was expected in 2015/2016, a small number of engineering 
changes still require installation in HMCS Corner Brook during her ongoing deep maintenance 
phase, as well as the procurement of several long-lead supply items. The engineering changes 
are related to weapon systems modifications which could not be performed during the submarine 
reactivation period and the purchase of long lead items is in support of these engineering changes.
Major Milestones: Initial203 2014 2015 2016
Effective Project Approval June 1998 
Main Contract Award July 1998 
Initial Support Contract Award July 1998 
IOC April 2006204 
FOC Dec. 2011205 Nov. 2012 
Project Close-Out March 2013206 2017  2018 2018
Progress in 2016:
HMCS Windsor participated in NATO exercise Dynamic Mongoose over the summer of 2016 
followed by a NATO Anti-Submarine Warfare operation in the region.207
203 RPP 1999/2000, 81.
204 RPP 2009/2010
205 RPP 2009/2010
206 RPP 2009/2010
207 
Royal Canadian Navy, “Victoria-Class Submarines Reach Operational Steady State,” Feb. 26, 2015. http://www.navy-
marine.forces.gc.ca/en/news-operations/news-view.page?doc=victoria-class-submarines-reach-operational-steady-state/
i6miwqrg 
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Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle
Estimated Total Cost: $1.250 billion 
Project Description:
The project will deliver to the Canadian Army a wheeled combat vehicle that will overcome 
deficiencies with the G-wagon light utility vehicle wheeled, the RG-31 armoured patrol vehicle, 
and the Coyote light armoured vehicle related to capacity, protection, mobility, weapons effects, 
information and human dimensions. This vehicle will fulfil a wide variety of roles on the 
battlefield, including but not limited to surveillance, security, command and control, cargo and 
personnel carrier. It will have a high degree of tactical mobility and provide a very high degree of 
crew protection. The project scope includes an estimated initial purchase of 500 vehicles and an 
optional purchase of up to 100 more, plus associated long-term in-service support.
Explanation of Variance:
The project proceeded initially under an accelerated project schedule that compressed its options 
analysis stage by 10 months. As a result, the preliminary statement of operational requirement, 
concept development and experimentation, and formal price and availability studies were delayed. 
Because of this, and the need to re-engineer the available pre-existing vehicles to meet the 
requirement, the definition stage was extended from 15 to 35 months.208 
Following the contract award in June 2012, six pre-production vehicles were received in July 2013  
for qualification testing at Canadian Forces Base Valcartier and at the United States Army’s 
Aberdeen Test Center in Maryland. In August 2014 as part of this process, the first round of testing 
identified design problems. The project returned to the contract design phase in order to allow the 
complex, interrelated designs for the vehicle’s structure, suspension and steering to be improved. 
Reliability testing resumed in the summer of 2015 and concluded by early 2016. Repeat engineering 
qualification testing will be conducted as necessary.209 
Major Milestones: Initial210 2014 2015 2016
Identification Phase Approval March 2008 
Preliminary Project Approval June 2009 
Effective Project Approval Summer 2011 June 2012 
Contract Awarded Fall 2011 June 2012 
IOC 2013 Spring 2015 2016 End 2016
FOC 2015 Spring 2016 2017 Mid-2018
Project Complete 2017 Fall 2016 2017 End 2018
Progress in 2016
A second round of reliability testing, at the U.S.’s Nevada Automotive Test Center was completed in 
April 2016.211 Vehicle deliveries began Aug. 12, 2016.212
208 Chief Review Services, Internal Audit: Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV). (Ottawa: Department of National 
Defence, 2011).
209 RPP 2015/2016
210 DPR 2010/2011
211 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-departmental-performance/2016-status-report-on-transformational-and-
major-crown-projects.page#lightarmouredvehicleiii 
212 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-equipment/tactical-armoured-patrol-vehicle.page 
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Tank Replacement Project
Estimated Total Cost: $650 million
Project Description:
The purpose of the Tank Replacement Project is to replace Canada’s aging Leopard C2 tank fleet 
with a modern, heavily protected, mobile, direct-fire support capability. The project is broken 
into two phases. Phase 1 consisted of the loan of 20 Leopard 2 A6M main battle tanks, two 
armoured recovery vehicles and logistics support from the German government for immediate 
deployment to Afghanistan, as well as the purchase of up to 100 surplus Leopard 2 tanks from 
the Netherlands’ government. Phase 2 will upgrade and introduce up to 100 Leopard 2 tanks and 
variants into service.213
Progress Report and Explanations of Variances: 
All 82 Leopard 2 A4, A4M and A6M MBT and the first eight Leopard 2 ARVs funded by the TRP 
project have been delivered. The four ARVs funded by the Force Mobility Enhancement Project 
have also been delivered. A4M upgrade is progressing with 13 vehicles of 20 complete. Costs 
continue to be tightly managed within the cost ceiling in accordance with the core deliverables and 
priorized activities.
At the Senior Review Board (SRB) meeting in June 2015, the SRB endorsed an extension to 
close-out from May 2015 to December 2017 in order to complete integrated logistics support 
requirements involving sparing, and special tooling and test equipment (STTE).214
Major Milestones: Initial215 2014 2015 2016
Memorandum to Cabinet March 2007 
Preliminary Project Approval March 2007 
Phase 1 MOU for German Loaners May 2007 
Phase 1 Contract to Upgrade Loaners  May 2007 
Phase 1 IOC Aug. 2007 
Phase 1 Acquisition of Dutch Tanks Dec. 2007 
Effective Project Approval Mid-2009 June 2009 
FOC Phase 2 2013+ Feb. 2015 Summer 2017 Summer 2017
Project Close-Out  2013+ May 2015 Fall 2017 Dec. 2017
Progress in 2016
No Information Publicly Available. 
213 RPP 2015/2016
214 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-departmental-performance/2016-status-report-on-transformational-and-
major-crown-projects.page#lightarmouredvehicleiii 
215 DPR 07/08
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Underwater Warfare Suite Upgrade
Estimated Total Cost: N/A.
Project costs have elsewhere been estimated at $100 million to $249 million216
Project Description:
The project will provide an upgraded underwater warfare suite to the Halifax-class frigates 
including sensors, processors and updated software. The project will correct a deficiency in the 
class’s detection ranges of submarines and torpedoes, improve underwater sensor performance 
in the littoral environment and provide a system design to enable continual improvement in a 
cost-effective manner. A minimum of six ship-sets of equipment will be acquired. Each ship-set 
includes new passive towed array sonar, a new sonobuoy processing system, an upgrade to the hull-
mounted sonar and a new active intercept capability. The project will also procure a minimum of 
four towed low-frequency active sonars. All 12 Halifax-class ships will be fitted with the required 
infrastructure to allow for the transfer of equipment and sensors among ships, as required.217
Explanation of Variance:
Major Milestones: Initial218 2016
Project Approval (Definition) May 2015 
Request for Proposal Dec. 2016 Dec. 2016
Project Approval (implementation) Nov. 2017 Dec. 2017
Contract Award Dec. 2017 Jan. 2018
Initial Operational Capability Aug. 2020 Aug. 2020
Full Operational Capability June 2024 June 202
Contract Close-Out Sept. 2024 Sept. 2024
Progress in 2016
No Information Publicly Available. 
216 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-defence-acquisition-guide-2016/naval-systems-36.page 
217 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-departmental-performance/2014-2015/section-iii-status-report-on-
transformational-and-major-crown-projects.page#AIMP 
218 RPP 2016/2017
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